Crisis of the Old Order - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 20

sired world order, the United States must work to re-create the basic governance institutions
of the system—investing in alliances, partnerships, multilateral institutions, special relation-
ships, great-power concerts, cooperative security pacts, and democratic security communit-
ies.
1 See interviews with Chirac by James Graff and Bruce Crumley, “France is not a pacifist country,” Time , 24
February 2003, 32-33; and James Hoagland, “Chirac's 'Multipolar World.'” Washington Post , 4 February 2004,
A23.
2 Signaling a return to America's postwar liberal-oriented leadership, the Obama administration's National Se-
curity Strategy , asserts that the United States “must pursue a rules-based international system that can advance our
own interests by serving mutual interests.” Office of the President, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC:
White House, May 2010).
3 On anticipations of a return to multipolarity and the end of American dominance, see Charles Kupchan, The
End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century (New York: Knopf,
2003); Parag Khanna, The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Age (New York: Random
House, 2008); Paul Starobin, After America: Narratives for the New Global Age (New York: Penguin Group, 2009);
Kishore Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift in Global Power to the East (New York:
Public Affairs, 2009); and Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (New York: Norton, 2009).
4 For arguments about the impact of the world economic crisis on the American neoliberal model and Washing-
ton's leadership capacities, see Joseph Stiglitz, America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy (New
York: Norton, 2010); and J. Bradford Lelong and Stephen S. Cohen, The End of Influence: What Happens when
Other Countries Have the Money (New York: Basic, 2010). On the growing economic limits on American grand
strategy, see Michael Mandelbaum, The Frugal Superpower: America's Global Leadership in a Cash-Strapped Era
(New York: Public Affairs, 2010); and David P. Calleo, Follies of Power: America's Unipolar Fantasy (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2010). On how the financial crisis and world recession have accelerated the rise in
influence of China and other non-Western countries, see Mathew J. Burrows and Jennifer Harris, “Revisiting the
Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis,” Washington Quarterly 32, no. 2 (April 2009), 27-38.
5 See Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global
Order (New York: Penguin, 2009). On the rise of ideological competition in world politics, see Steven Weber and
Bruce W. Jentleson, The End of Arrogance: America in the Global Competition of Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010).
6 This topic does not offer a general theory of the domestic sources of American grand strategy. The argument
is cast in terms of government choices about the organization of international order in the context of perceived in-
terests, opportunities, incentives, and constraints. A variety of doctrines, ideologies, and strategic visions compete
for influence among foreign policy elites. The influence of these competing doctrines, ideologies, and visions is
determined—at least, over the long term—by their responsiveness to these interests, opportunities, incentives, and
constraints. National political identity and traditions and considerations of political legitimacy are aspects of this de-
cision environment. In this sense, elites respond both to the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness.
For discussions of the complementarity of these logics, see Elinor Ostrom, “Rational Choice Theory and Institu-
tional Analysis: Toward Complementarity,” American Political Science Review 85, no. 1 (March 1991), 237-43;
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Or-
ganization 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998), 887-917; and Thomas Risse, “Constructivism and International Institutions:
Toward Conversations across Paradigms,” in Helen Milner and Ira Katznelson, eds., Political Science: The State of
the Discipline (New York: Norton, 2002), 597-623.