Crisis of the Old Order - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 19

Chapter 7 explores alternative pathways away from the current crisis. I identify three dif-
ferent possible futures. One involves a renegotiated American-led liberal hegemonic order.
Another possibility is the building of a post-hegemonic liberal order in which the United
States plays a more “normal” role within the context of declining unipolarity. A third pos-
sibility is that the crisis of the American-led order could give way to fragmentation and a
general decline in order itself. Regional blocs, spheres of influence, and complex patterns of
hubs and spokes could emerge in ways that leave the international order both radically less
open and less rule-based.
I argue that there are several factors that will shape the pathway forward. One is the actual
willingness of the United States to cede authority back to the international community and ac-
commodate itself to a system of more binding rules and institutions. Short of a radical shift in
the international distribution of power, the United States will remain the world's most power-
ful state for several decades to come. So there is reason to think that other countries would be
willing to see the United States play a leading role—and provide functional services—if the
terms are right. A second factor is the degree to which America's security capacities can be
leveraged into wider economic and political agreements. The United States has extraordinary
advantages in military power. The question is, to what extent can the United States use these
assets to strike bargains with other states on more general rules and institutions of global or-
der? If it can, the United States will find opportunities to renegotiate a modified hegemonic
system. Finally, the degree of divergence among the lead states in their visions of global or-
der will matter in how the crisis plays out. The question is whether non-Western rising states
such as China and India will seek to use their increasing power to usher in a substantially
different sort of international order.
In the end, I argue that despite America's imperial temptation, it is not doomed to abandon
rule-based order—and rising states are not destined to reject the basic features of liberal in-
ternational order. The United States ultimately will want to wield its power legitimately in a
world of rules and institutions. It will also have incentives to build and strengthen regional
and global institutions in preparation for a future after unipolarity. The rising power of China,
India and other non-Western states presents a challenge to the old American-led order that
will require new, expanded, and shared international governance arrangements.
If America is smart and plays its foreign policy “cards” right, twenty years from now,
it can still be at the center of a one-world system defined in terms of open markets, demo-
cratic community, cooperative security, and rule-based order. This future can be contrasted
with less-desirable alternatives familiar from history: great-power-balancing orders, regional
blocs, or bipolar rivalries. The United States should seek to consolidate a global order where
other countries “bandwagon” rather than balance against it—and where it remains at the cen-
ter of a prosperous and secure democratic-capitalist order, which in turn provides the archi-
tecture and axis points around which the wider global system turns. But to reestablish this de-