Crisis of the Old Order - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 14

Charles Maier argues, the American order—much like empires and other political orders of
the past—has had a distinctive set of characteristics or “institutional markers.” 25
But what sort of order was it? If the American postwar order has been a mix of command
and consent, what is the nature of this mix and how has it changed over time? Is the American
political formation an empire, or do its liberal features give it a shape and organization that
is distinct from the great empires of the past? Put simply, has the United States been engaged
in imperial rule or liberal rule?
The empire debate is an old one—shadowing the rise of American power itself. In the
early postwar years, in the 1960s, and again in the post-Cold War decades, scholars and com-
mentators have debated the character of American domination, arguing about whether it is
a modern form of empire. 26 The British writer and labor politician Harold Laski evoked a
looming American empire in 1947 when he said that “America bestrides the world like a co-
lossus; neither Rome at the height of its power nor Great Britain in the period of economic
supremacy enjoyed an influence so direct, so profound, or so pervasive.” 27 Later, during the
Vietnam War, critics and revisionist historians traced what was seen as a deep-rooted impulse
toward militarism and empire through the history of American foreign policy. Some writers
saw the underlying motive for empire as essentially economic, tracing this impulse back to
the Open Door policy of the turn of the nineteenth century. 28 Others saw imperial ambition
rooted in a logic of security and geopolitical control, given impetus by the Cold War. As
one prominent critic of American foreign policy argued during this period: “Since 1945 this
country, not content with being primus inter pares among the nations, has sought not the del-
icate balance of power but a position of commanding superiority in weapons technology, in
the regulation of the international economy, and in the manipulation of the internal politics
of other countries.” 29
In recent years, the empire debate has returned, focusing on America's global ambitions
under conditions of unipolarity. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, geopolitical rivals to
the United States all but disappeared. Yet, a half century after their occupation, the United
States still provides security for Japan and Germany—until recently, the world's second- and
third-largest economies. American military bases and carrier battle groups project power in-
to all corners of the world—and indeed the United States possesses a near monopoly on the
use of force internationally. Upon this unipolar foundation, the Bush administration came to
power and, after the attacks of September 11, 2001, pursued a “war on terror,” invaded Afgh-
anistan and Iraq, expanded the military budget, and put forward a controversial 2002 Nation-
al Security Strategy articulating a doctrine of military preemption in the face of self-defined
threats. American power was once again thrust into the light of day—and it deeply unsettled
much of the world. Not surprisingly, the concept of empire was invoked again to describe
America's global ambitions and exercise of power in a one-superpower world. 30