Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
Looking into this brave new world, the United States will find itself needing to share
power and rely in part on others to ensure its security. It will not be able to depend on unipolar
power or airtight borders. To operate in this coming world, the United States will need, above
all else, authority and respect as a global leader. It has lost some of that authority and respect
in recent years. In committing itself to a grand strategy of liberal order building, it can begin
the process of gaining it back.
1
E. H. Carr,
The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations
(Lon-
don: Macmillan, 1951).
2
Karl Polanyi,
The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time
(Boston: Beacon,
1957).
3
Robert Jervis, “Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace,”
American Political Science Review
96,
no. 1 (2002), 1-14; and John Lewis Gaddis, “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International
System,”
International Security
10, no. 4 (Spring 1986), 99-142.
4
See discussion of possible upheavals and discontinuities in Ikenberry, “Conclusion,” in Ikenberry,
America Un-
rivaled
. For historical reflections, see Harold James,
The End of Globalization: Lessons from the Great Depression
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).
5
Niall Ferguson,
The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West
(New York:
Penguin, 2006), xvii.
6
Jacques,
When China Rules the World
. See also Leonard,
What Does China Think
; Eva Paus, Penelope B.
Prime, and Jon Western, eds.,
Global Giant: Is China Changing the Rules of the Game?
(New York: Palgrave,
2009); and Stefan Halper,
The Beijing Consensus: How China's Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-
First Century
(New York: Basic, 2010).
7
See Naazneen Barma, Ely Ratner, and Steven Weber, “A World without the West,”
National Interest
, no. 90
(July/August 2007), 23-30; Charles Kupchan and Adam Mount, “The Autonomy Rule,”
Democracy: A Journal of
Ideas
, no. 12 (Spring 2009), 8-21; and Steven Weber and Bruce W. Jentleson,
The End of Arrogance: America in
the Global Competition of Ideas
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).
8
See Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West”; and Ikenberry, “The Rise of China: Power,
Institutions, and the Western Order,” in Robert Ross and Zhu Feng, eds.,
China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the
Future of International Politics
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 89-114.
9
See essays on shared American and Chinese visions of economic modernization and global integration in
Richard Rosecrance and Gu Guoliang, eds,
Power and Restraint: A Shared Vision for the U.S.-Chinese Relationship
(New York: Public Affairs, 2009).
10
China has incentives to try to reassure other states in the international system as it rises. To do this, it will find
that an important way to signal restraint and commitment is its willingness to participate in existing institutions. This
logic of restraint and reassurance will lead China deeper into the existing order rather than away from it.
11
Marc Lanteigne,
China and International Institutions: Alternative Paths to Global Power
(New York: Rout-
ledge, 2007). For an important account of Chinese participation in regional and global institutions and its impact,
see Alastair Iain Johnston,
Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2008).
12
This is the view of Yong Deng, who argues that Chinese foreign policy is fundamentally oriented toward gain-
ing greater status and recognition in the international system but not seeking a radical reorganization of its under-
lying organizational principles. The aim is to gain position and respect within the existing system and work with
American hegemonic leadership. As Deng suggests, since the late-1990s, the Chinese government has been more
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