Conclusion: The Durability of Liberal International Order - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 247

transnational violence. Yet none of these threats is, in itself, so singularly preeminent that it
deserves to be the centerpiece of American grand strategy in the way that antifascism and
anticommunism did in an earlier era. 15
What is more, these various threats are interconnected—and it is their interactive effects
that represent the most acute danger. This point is stressed by Thomas Homer-Dixon: “It's
the convergence of stresses that's especially treacherous and makes synchronous failure a
possibility as never before. In coming years, our societies won't face one or two major chal-
lenges at once, as usually happened in the past. Instead, they'll face an alarming variety of
problems—likely including oil shortages, climate change, economic instability, and mega-
terrorism—all at the same time.” The danger is that several of these threats will materialize
at the same time and interact to generate greater violence and instability. “What happens, for
example, if together or in quick succession the world has to deal with a sudden shift in cli-
mate that sharply cuts food production in Europe and Asia, a severe oil price increase that
sends economies tumbling around the world, and a string of major terrorist attacks on several
Western capital cities?” 16 The global order itself would be put at risk, as well as the founda-
tions of American national security.
What unites these threats and challenges, as I noted in chapter 7 , is that they are all mani-
festations of rising security interdependence. More and more of what goes on in other coun-
tries matters for the health and safety of the United States and the rest of the world. Many of
the new dangers—such as health pandemics and transnational terrorist violence—stem from
the weakness of states rather than their strength. At the same time, technologies of violence
are evolving, providing opportunities for weak states or nonstate groups to threaten others at
a greater distance. When states are in a situation of security interdependence, they cannot go
it alone. They must negotiate and cooperate with other states and seek mutual restraints and
protections. The United States cannot hide or protect itself from threats under conditions of
rising security interdependence. It must get out in the world and work with other states to
build frameworks of cooperation and leverage capacities for action.
If the world of the twenty-first century were a town, the security threats faced by its lead-
ing citizens would not be organized crime or a violent assault by a radical mob on city hall. It
would be a breakdown of law enforcement and social services in the face of constantly chan-
ging and ultimately uncertain vagaries of criminality, nature, and circumstance. The neigh-
borhoods where the leading citizens live can only be made safe if the security and well-being
of the beaten-down and troubled neighborhoods were also improved. No neighborhood can
be left behind. At the same time, the town will need to build new capacities for social and
economic protection. People and groups will need to cooperate in new and far-reaching ways.
But the larger point is that today the United States confronts an unusually diverse and
diffuse array of threats and challenges. When we try to imagine what the premier threat to
the United States will be in 2020 or 2025, it is impossible to say with any confidence that