Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
straints. It underwrote order in various regions of the world. It provided public goods related
to stability and openness, and it engaged in bargaining and reciprocity with its allies and part-
ners. The center of gravity of this order was the West—and as it moved outward to Asia, Lat-
in America, and the developing world, the liberal logic gave way to more traditional imperial
and great-power domination. Globally, the order was hierarchical—dominated by the United
States—but infused with liberal characteristics.
This American-led liberal hegemonic order is now in crisis. The underlying foundations
that support this order have shifted. Pressures for change—and for the reorganization of or-
der—are growing. But amidst this great transformation, it is important to untangle what pre-
cisely is in crisis and what is not. My claim is that it is a crisis of authority—a struggle over
how liberal order should be governed, not a crisis over the underlying principles of liber-
al international order, defined as an open and loosely rule-based system. That is, what is in
dispute is how aspects of liberal order—sovereignty, institutions, participation, roles, and re-
sponsibilities—are to be allocated, but all within the order rather than in its wake.
If the old postwar hegemonic order were a business enterprise, it would have been called
American Inc. It was an order that, in important respects, was owned and operated by the
United States. The crisis today is really over ownership of that company. In effect, it is a
transition from a semiprivate company to one that is publicly owned and operated—with an
expanding array of shareholders and new members on the board of directors. This is true even
as non-Western states—most importantly, China—continue to rise up and struggle to define
their relationship to liberal international order.
To arrive at this argument, the preceding chapters have explored the theory and history
of international order. We have examined both the organizational logic of different types of
orders and ways in which these orders rise and decline. This exploration has allowed us to
identify and situate liberal international order in the context of wider types of international
orders—orders defined in terms of their mechanisms of stability and control (balance, com-
mand, and consent). This exploration has also allowed us to situate American-led liberal he-
gemonic order within the wider types of liberal international order. From these theoretical
considerations, we could trace the great historical shifts and evolution in the liberal inter-
national project. The liberal internationalism of Woodrow Wilson gave way to an updated
vision by Franklin Roosevelt, and after this to a Western-oriented hegemonic project built
during the Cold War. We have seen that the underlying foundation on which this Americ-
an liberal hegemonic project rested has been transformed. The Westphalian underpinnings
of liberal order—not fully appreciated by some liberal internationalists—have eroded. Uni-
polarity, eroded sovereignty, the shifting scale and scope of economic and security interde-
pendence—all have intensified the dilemmas and tensions within the liberal vision.
This leads us to the question: what comes next? I argue that there are several possibilities,
including a future in which the United States renegotiates for an ongoing leadership role in
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