Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
eign Affairs 86, no. 2 (March/April 2007), 34-46; and Kori N. Schake, Managing American Hegemony: Essays on
Power in a Time of Dominance (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2009).
33 Ian Clark argues that in order to rebuild its hegemonic position the United States must emphasize both its spe-
cial capacities to provide functional services for the system and the distinctive coalitional and consensual character
of American-style hegemony. Ian Clark, “Bringing Hegemony Back In: The United States and International Order,”
International Affairs 85, no. 1 (2009), 23-36.
34 The best statement of this vision is President George W. Bush's commencement speech at West Point, 1 June
2002.
35 President Barack Obama, “Remarks of the U.S. President in Oslo,” 10 December 2009.
36 Obama, “Remarks in Oslo.”
37 President Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy at West Point
Commencement,” 22 May 2010.
38 Obama, “Remarks at West Point.”
39 For essays exploring a wide array of post-liberal orders, see Greg Fry and Jacinta O'Hagan, eds., Contending
Images of World Politics (New York: St. Martin's, 2000).
40 David Calleo offers one vision of such an order, emphasizing movement toward regional groupings based on
economic affinities: “Countries with relatively compatible economies will probably group into blocs, perhaps built
around a dominant or common currency, or a relatively stable monetary union.” David Calleo, Follies of Power:
America's Unipolar Fantasy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 107.
41 See Mika Aaltola, “The International Airport: The Hub-and-Spoke Pedagogy of the American Empire,” Global
Network 5, no. 3 (2005), 261-78.
42 The National Intelligence Council's recent survey of global change sees the “return to multipolarity” as the
master trend of the coming decades. As the report argues: “[B]y 2025 the international system will be a global mul-
tipolar one. . . . Power will be more dispersed with the newer players bringing new rules of the game while risks
will increase that the traditional Western alliances will weaken.” See National Intelligence Council, Global Trends
2025 (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2008), iv. The Defense Department's strategic-planning re-
view makes a similar observation: “The distribution of global political, economic, and military power is shifting
and becoming more diffuse. The rise of China, the world's most populous country, and India, the world's largest
democracy, will continue to reshape the international system.” U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense
Review Report (February 2010), 7. A similar view is articulated by the British Foreign Office's Director for Strategy,
Planning and Analysis. See David Frost, “Atlantis Rediscovered: New Hope for Transatlantic Relations?” keynote
speech, RUSI's Global Leadership Forum, London, 11 June 2009. For a discussion of the logic and implications of
a “return to multipolarity,” see Barry Posen, “Emerging Multipolarity: Why Should We Care?” Current History 108
(November 2009), 347-52.
43 Randall Schweller describes the transition away from unipolarity as process of entropy, in which the organizing
power and energy of the center gives way to a slower devolution in organizational coherent and control. See Sch-
weller, “Ennui Becomes Us,” National Interest , no. 105 (January/February 2010), 00-000.
44 Robert Jervis makes this point as it relates to the degree to which the unipolar state will be supported or resisted
by other states. “Whether others will comply also depends on non-structural factors, especially the coincidence or
discrepancy between the worlds they prefer and the one sought by the superpower.” Robert Jervis, “Unipolarity: A
Structural Perspective,” World Politics (January 2009), 192.
45 See Mark Leonard, What Does China Think? (New York: Public Affairs Press, 2008).
46 I make this argument in G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West,” Foreign Affairs
87, no. 1 (January/February 2008), 23-37.
47 An ongoing debate exists on whether long-term shifts in American domestic politics are eroding support for
liberal internationalist foreign policy. See Jonathan Monten, “Without Heirs? Assessing the Decline of Liberal In-
ternationalism in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Perspectives on Politics 6, no. 2 (2009), 451-72; Charles Kupchan and Peter
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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