Dilemmas and Pathways of Liberal International Order - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 211

clude a reformed United Nations with a reorganized Security Council that expanded perman-
ent membership to rising and non-Western countries such as Japan, India, Brazil, and South
Africa. Other bodies that would grow in importance include the G-20, which—unlike the
G-8—includes representatives from both developed and emerging states. The Bretton Woods
institutions—the IMF and World Bank—would also expand and reapportion rights and mem-
bership. Countries such as China and India would gain significant voting shares in the gov-
ernance of these institutions while the United States and Europe would see their voting shares
contract. 26
This post-American liberal order would also see a further erosion of norms of Westphalian
sovereignty and the continuing spread of the notion of a responsibility to protect. The idea
that the international community has a right—and indeed a responsibility—to intervene in-
side states for human rights and security reasons would be increasingly embraced worldwide.
But this movement toward post-Westphalian norms of sovereignty leaves unanswered the
question of which states—and international bodies—would acquire the rights and authority
to decide where and how to act. Who is to speak for the international community on ques-
tions of responsibility to protect? It is difficult to see a liberal internationalism that has settled
this question. The logical move would be to turn to the authority of a reformed U.N. Security
Council. But if the recent past is a guide, the ability of the Security Council to actually reach
agreement and sanction the use of force is highly problematic. 27 Other less universal bod-
ies—such as NATO or a proposed League or Concert of Democracies—may provide altern-
ative sources of authority for intervention, but the legitimacy of these bodies is only partial
and contested. 28 The new liberal international order might solve this problem by fostering
greater agreement among the Security Council permanent member states over the rights and
obligations of the international community to act. More likely, questions about intervention
and the use of force will remain contested. Regional bodies and nonuniversal groupings of
like-minded states will continue to offer alternative sources of authority on these questions.
Beyond questions of humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect, security
threats coming from the potential diffusion of violence technologies into the hands of terrorist
groups will continue to generate incentives for more intrusive international arms control and
counterproliferation capacities. The International Atomic Energy Agency is the leading or-
ganizational edge of these multistate efforts. In the last two decades, the IAEA has developed
scientific and technical competence and legal frameworks for monitoring and inspections of
nuclear programs around the world. As nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons technolo-
gies grow more sophisticated and diffuse into troubled parts of the world, governments will
no doubt seek to expand IAEA-type capacities for monitoring, inspection, verification, and
safeguarding. Pressures will grow for norms of Westphalian sovereignty to continue to incre-
mentally give way to intrusive international security regimes. 29