Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
ives. So no rival democratic state or regional grouping has had an incentive to challenge or
overturn this liberal hegemonic order.
A grand bargain has stood behind this American-led liberal order. The United States is to
provide global services—such as security protection and support for open markets—which
makes other states willing to work with rather than resist American preeminence. The public
goods provided tended to make it worthwhile for these states to endure the day-to-day irrit-
ations of American dominance. The United States would operate within a system of rules
and institutions that reduced its ability to engage in the arbitrary and discriminate exercise
of power. The fact that the states that operated within this hegemonic system were Western
democracies also infused the operation of the order with consensual and reciprocal features
of interaction. In these ways, hierarchy and democratic community were reconciled, at least
to an extent that made the order more or less stable and legitimate.
What we have seen is that this trade-off seems to be shifting—and thereby exposing the
tensions between hierarchy and democratic community. Today, the United States appears to
be providing fewer public goods while, at the same time, the irritations associated with Amer-
ican dominance appear to be growing. It is useful to think about the changing dynamic in this
way. The United States is unique in that it is simultaneously both a provider of global gov-
ernance—through what has tended in the past to be the exercise of liberal hegemony—and
it is a great power that pursues its own national interest. America's liberal hegemonic role is
manifest when it champions the WTO, engages in international rule and regime creation, or
reaffirms its commitment to cooperative security in Asia and Europe. Its great-power role is
manifest, for example, when it seeks to protect its domestic steel or textile industry. When
it acts as a liberal hegemon, it is seeking to lead or manage the global system of rules and
institutions; when it is acting as a nationalist great power, it is seeking to respond to domestic
interests and its relative power position. The danger today is that these two roles—liberal he-
gemon and traditional great power—have been in increasing conflict. The grand bargain that
sustained liberal hegemonic order is in danger of unraveling, exposing the old tensions and
contradictions buried within. 22
So the danger to liberal internationalism lies with its greatest champion. The United States
does not appear to be doing as much today as in the past to sponsor and operate within a
system of consensual rule-based order. The 2008 financial crisis and global economic down-
turn has exposed the changed position of the United States. In previous postwar economic
crises, the United States played a role—directly or indirectly—in stabilizing global markets.
The most recent financial crisis was unique in that the United States was the source of the
instability. Whether it can return to the position of global economic leader remains uncertain.
This is a question of both America's willingness and its ability to manage the system. Why
the United States might be less willing to play the role of liberal hegemon is complex, rooted
in domestic politics. Some of it is very specifically associated with the Bush administration,
 
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