Dilemmas and Pathways of Liberal International Order - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 206

autonomy in exchange for similar commitments. Rules and institutions are embodiments of
these reciprocal commitments that circumscribe states' freedom of action. 17 In the postwar
era, the world saw a massive expansion of institutionalized cooperation that entailed such
commitments. These institutional agreements varied widely in regard to the degree to which
they entailed legally binding commitments. Generally speaking, the more states wanted other
countries to behave in predictable and rule-based ways, the greater their own requirements to
bind themselves to a set of multilateral rules and institutions. This entire logic is at the heart
of the liberal internationalist vision.
To be sure, some types of international agreements and institutions actually give states
greater capacity to make good on domestic democratic governance. Advanced states have
been able to offer greater stability and protections against economic downturns because of in-
ternational agreements that discipline other states and provide resources for states to manage
economic adjustments. In effect, states use international agreements to strengthen their abil-
ity to deliver socioeconomic services to their people. 18 International treaties and agreements
can also entail governmental commitments to uphold the rule of law at home, which serve
to strengthen the institutions of liberal democracy. For example, membership in the World
Trade Organization hinges on the ability of states to uphold the domestic rule of law in areas
of business, trade, and investment. This, in turn, strengthens state institutions—such as reg-
ulatory and judiciary bodies—that are central to liberal constitutional rule. 19 For transitional
states that are making small steps toward liberal democracy, international agreements can fa-
cilitate additional steps and reinforce rule-based governance itself. 20
But when these commitments bind states to international bodies that have realms of
autonomous authority, the cost in the form of lost state autonomy goes up. Countries
within the European Union have indeed made fundamental trade-offs of this extreme sort.
When the European Court can hand down rulings that require national governments to alter
their domestic laws, domestic judicial governance—and indirectly domestic democratic gov-
ernance—is compromised. External courts and judges are setting the parameters for domestic
courts and judges. The postwar human rights revolution pushes democracies in this direc-
tion—toward transnational justice and supranational judicial authority. This was the subvers-
ive move implicit in the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which peoples rights
were now seen as embedded in the international community and not simply defined and de-
fended by national governments. 21 The liberal international project foresees a future where
there will be a fuller realization of universal rights and standards of justice, and the obliga-
tions and commitments of national governments will need to adjust accordingly. International
authority—in the form of courts and collective governance mechanisms—will be expanded.
So the old problem of the trade-offs between national autonomy and popular sovereignty and
rule-based global order will intensify. And with it, so too will the questions of lost democrat-
ic accountability and popular sovereignty.