Dilemmas and Pathways of Liberal International Order - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 203

at least twofold. First, the sovereignty of a nation or people seems to be a necessary step
for the realization of individual rights. People should have the right to have their own gov-
ernment—and thereby the right to determine for themselves how they will live and be gov-
erned. Second, state sovereignty provides a legal-normative protection for a people against
external domination. It is integral to the Westphalian system of restraint and protection. A
balance of power limits the ability of one state to dominate others, and state sovereignty cre-
ates legal-normative barriers to outside interference. At the same time, liberal international-
ism embraces a universal vision of its principles and practices. States can advance and protect
individual rights, but they can also ignore and abuse those rights. If rights are universal, the
global political order must be organized in a way to protect and advance these deep and fun-
damental aspects of humanity. The growth of economic and security interdependence only
serves to intensify the contingency of sovereignty norms. The liberal internationalist dilemma
is to find a way to reconcile or manage these conflicting claims and imperatives.
The Limits and Dangers of Interventionism
Another dilemma faced by liberal internationalism follows directly from its commitment to
universal rights and protections. It relates to the limits and temptations of interventionism
and the use of force. If there are universal rights that impel the international community to
intervene with force across sovereign borders, who speaks and acts for the international com-
munity? How can the international community be sure that states that act on its behalf are in
fact upholding universal rights and protections? This is the question of whether liberal inter-
nationalism can safeguard against abuses that turn enlightened intervention into imperialism.
There are two problems here: the problem of choice and capacity to act and the problem of
imperial opportunism.
The first problem is that the norms and principles that establish the legitimacy and moral
obligation for the international community to intervene in troubled countries far outstrip the
capacity of states as a collective to agree on when and how to act. The international commu-
nity—or the United Nations as its operational voice—does not itself possess capacities to act.
So states must make good on these universal rights and obligations, and a variety of thorny
issues immediately emerge. There is the problem of how the international community makes
decisions about when and where to act. While the U.N. Security Council is the authoritat-
ive voice of the international community, it is also a forum for great-power politics and it
often cannot overcome divisions to pass authorizing resolutions. If the United Nations does
not authorize action, can or should states act anyway? There is also the problem of collective
action. The international community may find its voice and urge action, but sustained milit-
ary action is costly and so it is not certain that states will in fact respond to all legitimate and
pressing circumstances. Principles and rights go undefended. The danger here is not simply