Dilemmas and Pathways of Liberal International Order - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 200

diminished, and this is a problem for liberal internationalism. Historically, the balance-of-
power state system provided a foundation for international law and rule-based order in two
ways. One is by solving the power problem through an equilibrium of power among the ma-
jor states. An international system organized around a balance of power restricts the ability
of any one state to dominate the whole system. The other is that states themselves sought law
and rules to strengthen their position and capacities within the international order. When a
state system based on the balance of power disappears and norms of state sovereignty erode,
these foundational supports disappear. 1
International law emerged in the modern era as a way of protecting and enshrining the
sovereignty and supreme legal authority of the state. Treaties and legal doctrines as well as
the wider array of international rules and institutions emerged inside the West and the global
system over the centuries as tools by which states could signal restraint, commitment, and
mutual recognition. 2 At the same time, this emerging infrastructure of laws and rules was
built upon a shifting great-power system where power was diffused and balanced among ma-
jor states. In effect, laws and rules did not check power—it was the underlying balance-of-
power system that did the checking. When power was checked and in a stable equilibrium,
the circumstances were present to construct and operate within a loosely rule-based order.
Of course, there are compensating features that the liberal order itself provides. If the
great powers themselves are democracies, power disparities are of less significance. Binding
strategies of security cooperation can also reduce the threats otherwise inherent in unbalanced
power disparities. 3 But when one country is overwhelmingly powerful and the protections of
balance are lost, uncertainties do emerge over the commitment of that unipolar state to law
and rule-based order. The system itself does not generate protections at it does within a bal-
ance of power order. The protections are based not on the functioning of the system but on
the willingness and capacity of the leading state to act in a restrained and enlightened self-
interested way. This is a different logic—and it is arguably a weaker foundation for law and
rule-based order. At the very least, states within the liberal order are put in a position to reas-
sess the new risks and rewards that come with a system in which power is not balanced and
where restraints and protections are offered instead by the unipolar state.
The foundations of liberal order are weakened—or at least thrown into question—in a
second sense. In the postwar era, international law and institutions flourished in the West
and around the world partly because this resulting liberal order created rules and institu-
tions that strengthened the capacities of states. For example, the postwar economic rules
and institutions—starting with the Bretton Woods agreements—provided mechanisms by
which Western governments could strengthen their ability to stabilize and manage their eco-
nomies. A great deal of contemporary international rules and institutions are still of this
sort—facilitating states' ability to open up to flows of goods and investments and manage
complex interactions.