Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
There are four central claims in this topic. First, a distinctive type of international order
was constructed after World War II. At its core, it was a hierarchical order with liberal char-
acteristics. America played the leading role in the provision of rule and stability in that order.
It was a hierarchical system that was built on both American power dominance and liberal
principles of governance. The United States was the dominant state, but its power advantages
were muted and mediated by an array of postwar rules, institutions, and reciprocal political
processes—backed up by shared strategic interests and political bargains. Weaker and sec-
ondary states were given institutionalized access to the exercise of American power. The Un-
ited States provided public goods and operated within a loose system of multilateral rules and
institutions. American hegemonic power and liberal international order were fused—indeed
they each were dependent on the other. But the strategic bargains and institutional founda-
tions of this liberal hegemonic order have eroded, and as a result, the authority with which
the United States has wielded power in this system has also diminished.
Second, there are deep sources for this authority crisis, rooted in the transformation of
the Westphalian organization of the state system. The rise of American unipolarity and
the erosion of norms of state sovereignty—along with other deep shifts in the global sys-
tem—have eroded the foundations of the old order and thrown the basic terms of order and
rule of world politics into dispute. In a bipolar or multipolar system, powerful states “rule” in
the process of leading a coalition of states to balance against other states. When the system
shifts to unipolarity, this logic of rule disappears. Rule is no longer based on leadership of a
balancing coalition or on the resulting equilibrium of power but on the predominance of one
state. This is new and different—and potentially threatening to weaker and secondary states.
As a result, the power of the leading state is thrown into the full light of day.
The end of the Cold War ushered in a world system characterized by unipolarity and glob-
alization. Relations between poles and peripheries shifted. During the Cold War, the liberal
order was built primarily within the Western advanced industrial world. It existed within one
half of the larger bipolar global system. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end
of bipolarity, the “inside” Western system became the “outside” order. This large-scale ex-
pansion of the liberal order set new players and issues into motion. More recently, the rise of
new security threats has brought into question the logic of alliance and security partnerships.
After September 11, 2001, America showed itself to be not the satisfied protector of the old
order but a threatened and insecure power that resisted the bargains and restraints of its own
postwar order. As a result, in the decades of the new century, the character of rule in world
politics has been thrown into question.
Third, to understand the nature of this crisis and the future of liberal international order,
we need to understand the types of international order—and the sources of rule and authority,
power, and legitimacy within them. In the first instance, this means identifying the various
logics of liberal order and the ways in which sovereignty, rules, and hierarchy can be arrayed.
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