Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
3
See Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War,”
Inter-
national Security
25, no. 3 (Winter 2000/01), 5-53.
4
President George H. W. Bush articulated this American—and Western—effort to convey restraint in the face
of Soviet troubles in his 1990 New Year's greetings to the Soviet people, stating that “the West seeks no advantage
from the extraordinary changes underway in the East.” President Bush, “New Year's Message to the People of the
Soviet Union,” 1 January 1990,
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents
26 (8 January 1990), 1.
5
Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, “The International Sources of Soviet Change,”
International Security
16, no. 3 (Winter 1991/92), 74-118; and Deudney and Ikenberry, “The Unravelling of the Cold War Settlement,”
Survival
51, no. 6 (December 2009-January 2010), 39-62.
6
See survey of views by Michael Mastanduno, “A Realist View: Three Images of the Coming International
Order,” in T. V. Paul and John A. Hall, eds.,
International Order and the Future of World Politics
(New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1999), 19-40.
7
Waltz,
Theory of International Politics
.
8
John Mearsheimer, “Disorder Restored,” in Graham Allison and Gregory Treverton, eds.,
Rethinking America's
Security
(New York: Norton, 1992), 227. See also John Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability of Europe
after the Cold War,”
International Security
15 (Summer 1990), 5-57; John Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss
the Cold War,”
Atlantic Monthly
, no. 266 (August 1990), 35-50.
9
Kenneth Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,”
International Security
18, no. 2 (Fall 1993),
45-73.
10
See Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise,”
International Security
17 (Spring 1993), 5-51.
11
Aaron L. Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Era,”
International Security
18, no.
3 (Winter 1993/94), 5-33.
12
Eric Heginbotham and Richard Samuels, “Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy,”
International Se-
curity
22, no. 4 (Spring 1998), 171-203.
13
Lester Thurow,
Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle Among Japan, Europe, and America
(New York:
Morrow, 1992); and Fred Bergsten, “America's Two Front Economic Conflict,”
Foreign Affairs
80, no. 2 (March/
April 2001), 16-27. For a survey of American thinking as it related to Japan and Asia during this period, see Mi-
chael Mastanduno, “Models, Markets, and Power: Political Economy and the Asia-Pacific, 1989-1999,”
Review of
International Studies
26 (2000), 493-507.
14
James Mann,
The Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet
(New York: Viking, 2004), 210. See
also Barton Gellman, “Keeping the U.S. First: Pentagon Would Preclude a Rival Superpower,”
Washington Post
, 11
March 1992, A1; and Barton Gellman, “Pentagon Abandons Goal of Thwarting U.S. Rivals,”
Washington Post
, 24
May 1992, A1.
15
Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney,
Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy
(Wash-
ington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1993), 3. Quoted in Mann,
Rise of the Vulcans
, 212. For a retrospect-
ive on the ideas and reactions triggered by the 1992 defense planning document, see Eric S. Edelman, “The Strange
Career of the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance,” in Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffery Legro, eds.,
When Walls Come
Down: Berlin, 9/11 and U.S. Strategy in Uncertain Times
(Manuscript, Miller Center of Public Affairs, University
of Virginia, forthcoming).
16
Some scholars did see the liberal international order as the emerging core of the post-Cold War system. Mi-
chael McFaul and James M. Goldgeier, “A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era,”
International Organization
46, no. 2 (Spring 1992), 467-92; and Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, “The Lo-
gic of the West,”
World Policy Journal
10 (Winter 1993/94), 17-26.
17
See James A. Baker III,
The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace
(New York: Putnam, 1995),
172-73.
Search WWH ::
Custom Search