Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
power could be turned into useable diplomatic and political influence. More generally, the
administration's overestimation of American power reinforced the contradiction in Bush's
grand strategy between its unipolar and nationalist visions. In an echo of the classic problem
of great-power overextension, overconfidence in American power led to bold imperial-he-
gemonic ambitions that foundered because that power was insufficient to overcome foreign
resistance and dwindling domestic support. These failures, in turn, reinforced American na-
tionalism and global disengagement.
Third, there are more specific problems associated with the Bush grand strategy of pree-
mption and regime change. As the Iraq war demonstrates, the use of force to eliminate WMD
capabilities or overturn dangerous regimes is never simple, whether it is pursued unilater-
ally or by a concert of major states. After the military intervention is over, the target country
has to be put back together. Peacekeeping and state building are inevitably required, as are
long-term strategies that bring the U.N., the World Bank, and the major powers together to
orchestrate aid and other forms of assistance. This is the costly and often forgotten underside
to military interventionism. Peacekeeping troops may be required for many years, even after
a new regime is built. Regional conflicts inflamed by outside military intervention must also
be attended to. This is the “long tail” of burdens and commitments that comes with every
major military action. It is unclear that the United States would be able to either pay the price
for these undertakings itself or generate cooperation with other states to share the burdens.
Beyond this, it is also unclear that Bush's unipolar grand strategy could generate the co-
operation needed to tackle the wider array of global challenges. In the fight on terrorism, the
United States needs cooperation from Europeans and Asian countries in intelligence, law en-
forcement, and logistics. Outside the security sphere, realizing U.S. objectives depends even
more on a continuous stream of amicable working relations with major states around the
world. It needs partners for trade liberalization, global financial stabilization, environment-
al protection, deterrence of transnational organized crime, management of the rise of China,
and a host of other thorny challenges. But it is impossible to expect would-be partners to ac-
quiesce in America's self-appointed global security protectorate and then pursue business as
usual in all other domains.
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Finally, there is the fundamental problem of establishing consent from other countries for
Bush's unipolar security order. This is a problem that emerges in particular from other demo-
cratic countries, particularly in Europe—ironically, countries that are most closely allied with
the United States. In these democratic countries, popular sentiments against old-style power
politics and the use of force places a constraint—sometimes large and sometimes small—on
the ability of their leaders to cooperate with the United States. The failure of the Bush vision
of a unipolar security order is that it is an order that cannot legitimate itself within the bounds
of the wider democratic world. Legitimacy in the eyes of the democratic public—in the West
and beyond—appears to require some deference to the rule of law. Foreigners, after all, are
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