Crisis of the Old Order - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 4

age the leadership of the American liberal hegemonic order? Or is the struggle deeper than
this, rooted in disagreements over the virtues and liabilities of the American hegemonic or-
ganization of liberal international order? Or is it even deeper still, rooted in a breakdown of
consensus among leading states—old Western states and rising non-Western states—in the
virtues of liberal internationalism as a way of organizing international relations?
In this topic, I argue that the crisis of the old order transcends controversies generated by
recent American foreign policy or even the ongoing economic crisis. It is a crisis of authority
within the old hegemonic organization of liberal order, not a crisis in the deep principles of
the order itself. It is a crisis of governance.
This crisis stems from the fact that the underlying foundations of the old order have been
transformed. Changes include shifts in power, contested norms of sovereignty, threats related
to nonstate actors, and the scope of participating states. America's hegemonic leadership of
the liberal international order was made acceptable to other states during the postwar dec-
ades because it provided security and other “system services” to a wide range of states. That
authority is now less securely established. This does not mean the inevitable end of liberal
order. But it does raise a basic challenge for that order: establishing legitimate authority for
concerted international action on behalf of the global community, doing so at a time when
old relations of authority are eroding.
Although the old American-led hegemonic system is troubled, what is striking about liber-
al internationalism is its durability. The last decade has brought remarkable upheavals in the
global system—the emergence of new powers, financial crises, a global recession, and bitter
disputes among allies over American unipolar ambitions. Despite these upheavals, liberal in-
ternational order as an organizational logic of world politics has proven resilient. It is still in
demand. Appealing alternatives to an open and rule-based order simply have not crystallized.
On the contrary, the rise of non-Western powers and the growth of economic and security
interdependence are creating new constituencies and pressures for liberal international order.
Ironically, the old order has, in some ways, been the victim of its own success. It success-
fully defeated the threat—Communist expansionism—that, in part, drove its creation. It suc-
ceeded in creating a relatively open and robust system of trade and investment. The demise
of the Soviet Union has reduced the importance of American military guarantees in Western
Europe and East Asia. Economic growth in countries like China and India has created new
centers of global power. These and other developments have led to profound questions about
the American-centered nature of the old order. That has led not to a rejection per se of liberal
order but to a call to renegotiate authority among the United States and other key stakehold-
ers. In short, we need a new bargain, not a new system. And if this constitutes a crisis of
authority, it is worth remembering that liberal international order has encountered crises in
the past and evolved as a result. I believe it will again.