The Great Transformation and the Failure of Illiberal Hegemony - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 171

In the 1990s, this contingent character of sovereignty was pushed further. The internation-
al community was seen to have a right—even a moral obligation—to intervene in troubled
states to prevent genocide and mass killing. NATO's interventions in the Balkans and the war
against Serbia were defining actions of this sort. As diplomatic negotiations at the U.N. Se-
curity Council over the crisis in Kosovo unfolded in 1998, Russia refused to agree to author-
ization of military action in what was an internal conflict. In the absence of U.N. approval, an
American-led NATO operation did intervene. In framing this action, U.N. Secretary-General
Kofi Annan articulated a view of the contingent nature of norms of sovereignty and noninter-
vention as enshrined in the U.N. Charter. As Strobe Talbott recounts Annan's views:
[I]f the behavior of a regime toward its own people is egregious, it is not just outsiders'
business to object but their responsibility to step in, stop the offenses, and even change
the regime. “State frontiers,” Annan said, “should no longer be seen as a watertight pro-
tection for war criminals or mass murderers. The fact that a conflict is 'internal' does
not give the parties any right to disregard the most basic rules of human conduct.” He
acknowledged that “the Charter protects the sovereignty of peoples,” and that it pro-
hibits the UN from intervening “in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any State.” However, he added, that the principle “was never meant as
a licence for governments to trample on human rights and human dignity. Sovereignty
implies responsibility, not just power.” 45
A year later, Annan observed that “[s]tate sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being
redefined.” Modern states, he argued, are “now widely understood to be instruments at the
service of their people, and not viceversa. . . . When we read the Charter today, we are more
than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human rights, not to protect those
who abuse them.” 46 This notion that sovereignty entails responsibilities as well as rights and
protections was the leading edge in a gradual and evolving redefinition of the meaning of na-
tional sovereignty. The idea was further developed by an International Commission on Inter-
vention and State Sovereignty, which advanced the idea of the “responsibility to protect.” 47
The international community had new obligations to see that basic human rights were protec-
ted within countries, particularly when faced with mass atrocities and other acts of organized
violence. 48
The norms of state sovereignty were further eroded in the aftermath of September 11. The
American-led intervention in Afghanistan—where outside military force was used to topple
a regime that actively protected terrorist attackers—was widely seen as a legitimate act of
self-defense. The outside world had a legitimate claim to what goes on within a sovereign
state if that state provides a launching pad, breeding ground, or protected area for transna-
tional violence. The Bush administration pushed the limits of this principle in its invasion of