The Great Transformation and the Failure of Illiberal Hegemony - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 163

munity of market democracies” and “foster and consolidate new democracies and market
economies where possible.” The United States would help “democracy and market econom-
ies take root,” which would in turn expand and strengthen the wider Western democratic or-
der. 20 This strategy was targeted primarily at those parts of the world that were beginning
the process of transition to market democracy: countries of Central and Eastern Europe and
the Asia-Pacific region. Promising domestic reforms in those countries would be encour-
aged—and locked in if possible—through new trade pacts and security partnerships. In 1994,
the Clinton administration provided a formal statement of this strategy of engagement and
enlargement, calling for a multilateral approach to major foreign policy challenges: “Whether
the problem is nuclear proliferation, regional instability, the reversal of reform in the foreign
Soviet empire, or unfair trade practices, the threats and challenges we face demand cooper-
ation, multilateral solutions. Therefore, the only responsible U.S. strategy is one that seeks
to ensure U.S. influence over and participation in collective decision-making in a wide and
growing range of circumstances.” 21
By the end of the 1990s, a major consolidation and expansion of the U.S.-led international
liberal order had been accomplished. The organizational logic of the Western order built dur-
ing the Cold War was extended to the global level. The first round of NATO expansion was
accomplished, providing an institutional basis to stabilize and embed new entrants into the
Western order—creating greater security among alliance partners and reinforcing democratic
and market institutions. NAFTA and APEC also were pursued as mechanisms to reinforce
and lock in the worldwide movement begun in the late 1980s toward economic and trade lib-
eralization. Finally, the creation of the WTO in 1995 provided a further attempt to expand
and institutionally strengthen the foundations of liberal international order. Building on the
old GATT agreements, the WTO marked a major step forward in establishing a judicial basis
for international trade law. A formal organization was established with an independent sec-
retariat, a formal dispute-settlement mechanism, and an expanded institutional framework for
international trade cooperation. 22
An important impulse behind the foreign policy activity of both the first Bush administra-
tion and the Clinton administration was to ensure that the United States would not pull back
from global leadership. The Bush administration was determined that NATO stay engaged on
the European continent and do so with the United States in the lead, perpetuating its role as a
stabilizing presence. Bush administration institution building, under the “Europe whole and
free” rubric, was designed to ensure that the conflicts of the early twentieth century would
not return. The Clinton administration carried these strategies forward. In addition, as Chollet
and Goldgeier argue, Clinton's and Secretary of State Albright's use of the term “indispens-
able nation” was directed toward a domestic audience. They feared America might turn in-
ward and wanted to encourage the country to stay engaged in the world. 23 Throughout these
years, the logic of liberal order building provided a unifying orientation.