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bound to Europe, Europe itself would need to be unified and integrated so as to provide the
anchoring foundation.
While the United States promoted European unity and the integration of Germany, British
and French governments sought to bind the United States to Europe. The evolution of policy
in Washington from pushing for a European third force to accepting an ongoing security
commitment within NATO was marked by American reluctance and European persistence.
At each turn, European leaders agreed to steps toward greater integration in exchange for
corresponding assurances and commitments from the United States. NATO and the Americ-
an security commitment was the solution to multiple interlocking problems—worry about a
return of German militarism, British ambivalence about European economic integration, the
growing Soviet threat, and uncertainties about American power.
The British and French governments had their specific reasons for resisting European uni-
fication and the reintegration of Germany. Britain wanted to maintain its special relationship
with Washington and did not want to anchor its security in a united Europe that was inde-
pendent of the United States. A European third force would also draw on resources the Brit-
ish needed to shore up postwar strains in its Commonwealth system. Like other European
countries, Britain also feared that Germany or even the Soviet Union might come to domin-
ate a united Europe. The French were more enthusiastic about a united Europe, which would
provide a basis to extend their leadership of the continent. They also saw their own steps
to draw Germany into cooperative ties—most importantly, with the Coal and Steel Commu-
nity—as key mechanisms to gain some control over the terms of German economic reinteg-
ration. But the French government insisted that the rehabilitation of western Germany would
only be acceptable within a security framework that involved the United States. American
security ties would establish assurances against a resurgent German state while making the
United States more predictable and constrained and reducing the burdens on French security
expenditures.
If an Atlantic-wide alliance bound western Germany and the United States to Europe, it
also reinforced British and French commitment to an open and united Europe. The United
States not only wanted to bring Germany back into the European fold, it also wanted to reori-
ent Europe itself. In an echo of Wilson's critique of the “old politics” of Europe after World
War I, American officials after 1945 emphasized the need for reform of nationalist and im-
perialist tendencies. And in their view, encouraging integration would achieve this, not only
making Germany safe for Europe but also making Europe safe for the world. The Marshall
Plan reflected this American thinking, as did the Truman administration's support for the
Brussels Pact, the European Defense Community (EDC), and the Schuman Plan. In the nego-
tiations over the NATO treaty in 1948, American officials made clear to the Europeans that
a security commitment hinged on European movement toward integration. One State Depart-
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