The Rise of the American System - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 131

nomic integration, and political development were all compatible and connected, together
yielding a one-world global system that advanced the life conditions of everyone. Liberal or-
der and modernization of societies went hand in hand. The liberal vision of Roosevelt and
Truman was more world-weary than Wilson's, but they nonetheless saw history moving in
a progressive direction, helped along by increasingly elaborate and layered frameworks for
economic and security cooperation.
American Hegemonic Leadership
The final aspect of this order was American hegemonic leadership. The United States took
the lead in organizing and running the order, on terms that were more or less mutually agree-
able to states that were inside it. In effect, the United States had a special functional-oper-
ational role. As Dean Acheson told a group of policy makers at the end of 1947, “We are
going to understand that our function in the world will require all of the power and all the
thought and all the calmness we have at our disposal.” 60 The United States stepped in to
provide the public goods of security protection, market openness, and sponsorship of rules
and institutions. The American dollar became an international currency and the American
domestic market became an engine of global economic growth. Alliance institutions and an
array of formal and informal intergovernmental institutions provided the international order
with mechanisms and channels for consultation and collaboration. The security of each be-
came the security of all. The resulting order was hierarchical—the United States was most
powerful and led the order. But the rules and institutions that it promulgated gave the order
its liberal character. 61
These hegemonic functions entail ongoing American involvement in keeping the order
open, stable, and loosely rule-based. 62 When the hegemonic state leads in the provision of
rules and institutions, it is providing a public good for the wider order. But it is also using
these rules and institutions to establish restraints and commitments on the uses of its power.
By undertaking these hegemonic tasks, the leading state serves its long-term interests. It fa-
cilitates the creation of a relatively congenial environment in which to pursue its interests. It
also signals its cooperative intentions to other states. In return, other states agree to cooperate
with the leading state. These weaker and secondary states get an international order that is
not threatened by the indiscriminate and arbitrary exercise of power. They also gain some ac-
cess—through the reciprocal political processes of give-and-take that emerge—to the overall
management of the order.
The ability of the leading state to construct rules and institutions and exercise leadership is
also based on the security and economic assets that it controls. As the most militarily power-
ful state, the hegemonic state is able to offer security protection to other states in exchange
for their cooperation. This security protection may be provided in multilateral security organ-