Unipolarity and Its Consequences - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 110

36 See Valerie Bunce, “The Empire Strikes Back: The Evolution of the Eastern Bloc from Soviet Asset to Liabil-
ity,” International Organization 39, no. 1 (1985), 1-46.
37 Waltz, Theory of International Politics , chap. 9.
38 Hedley Bull, Anarchical Society .
39 Ikenberry, After Victory , chap. 3.
40 Michael Mastanduno, “System Maker and Privilege Taker: U.S. Power and the International Political
Economy,” World Politics 61, no. 1 (January 2009), 121-54 .
41 See E. H. Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations
(London: Macmillan, 1951); A.F.K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf, 1958); Randall L. Schweller,
“Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International Security 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994),
72-107; and Robert Powell, “Stability and the Distribution of Power,” World Politics 48, no. 2 (1996), 239-67.
42 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics , chap. 2.
43 Robert Jervis, “Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective,” World Politics , 61, no. 1 (January 2009).
44 Jervis, “Unipolarity,” 199.
45 Jervis, “Unipolarity,” 200.
46 Jervis, “Unipolarity,” 194.
47 See Jakub J. Grygiel, “Imperial Allies,” Orbis 50, no. 2 (Spring 2006), 209-21.
48 Krisch argues that, under conditions of bipolarity, the dominant state may be particularly concerned with its le-
gitimacy, or at least more so than in multipolar and unipolar systems. “In bipolar international systems, for example,
the hegemonic powers tend to be more concerned about the stability of their sphere of influence than in multipolar
or unipolar systems, because defection usually results in an immediate gain for the other hegemon. Thus, in such set-
tings, we can expect relatively greater efforts at legitimizing dominance, often times through the use of multilateral
institutions.” Nico Krisch, “International Law in Times of Hegemony,” European Journal of International Law 16,
no. 3 (2005), 369-408.
49 For explorations of the ways in which legitimacy acts to impose costs and discipline the exercise of unipolarity,
see Martha Finnemore, “Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole Isn't
All It's Cracked Up to Be,” World Politics 61, no. 1 (January 2009), 58-85; and Christian Reus-Smit, American
Power and World Order (London: Polity, 2004).
50 This argument is developed in Ikenberry, After Victory , chap. 3.