Unipolarity and Its Consequences - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 102

Shifts in the Character of the Order
How does the shift from Cold War bipolarity to unipolarity alter the overall character of the
American-led international order? In chapter 3 , I argued that during the postwar era, the Un-
ited States built a liberal hegemonic order around two strategies of rule—rule through rules
and rule through relationships. Both strategies are employed in efforts to assert political con-
trol over other states and the wider international order. One strategy is the multilateral, rule-
based approach manifest most fully in America's relations with Western Europe and in world
economic governance. The other strategy is what might be called hub-and-spoke bilateral-
ism, and it has been pursued in America's relations with countries in East Asia. The choice of
strategy is driven by functional incentives and trade-offs. The shift to unipolarity appears to
generate some incentives—but also costs—for the United States to pursue the logic of hub-
and-spoke bilateralism.
Each of the two strategies offers some advantages over the other, as well as costs. The
multilateral rule-based strategy creates rules and institutions that establish ordered relations
that are potentially more efficient and legitimate, while the bilateral hub-and-spoke strategy
offers the unipolar state fewer restrictions on its policy autonomy and more direct ways to
use power to shape the policies of other states. (See table 4-1 .)
As noted earlier, the two logics of rule have been manifest, respectively, in America's
relations with Western Europe and East Asia. The United States agreed to a multilateral
order with Europe because it determined that the restraints on its own power through NATO
and other multilateral institutions was worth what it got in return. Britain, France, and other
European states were willing to accept multilateral agreements to the extent that they also
constrained and regularized U.S. economic and security actions. American agreement to op-
erate within a multilateral economic order and make an alliance-based security commitment
to Europe was worth the price: it ensured that Germany and the rest of Western Europe would
be integrated into a wider, American-centered international order. At the same time, the actu-
al restraints on American policy were minimized through veto rights and first-among-equals
status within these institutions. In East Asia, security relations quickly became bilateral. The
United States was dominant in East Asia yet it wanted less out of the region, so giving up
policy autonomy in exchange for institutionalized cooperation there was less necessary. In
Europe, the United States had an elaborate agenda of uniting Europe, creating an institutional
bulwark against communism, and supporting centrist democratic governments. These goals
could not be realized simply by exercising power directly. To get what it wanted, the United
States had to bargain with the Europeans, and this meant agreeing to institutionally restrain
and commit its power. In East Asia, the building of order around bilateral pacts was more de-
sirable because multilateralism would entail more restraints on American freedom of action.