Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
what terms. This may be particularly true in the security realm. The leading state may seek
fewer rules and institutional constraints in the provision of security protection or otherwise
attempt to alter old security bargains. As Michael Mastanduno argues, a dominant state can
be both a “system maker” and a “privilege taker”—it can seek simultaneously to provide pub-
lic goods and to exploit its advantageous power position for parochial gain. It simultaneously
enlists the cooperation of other states and seeks, with varying success, to force adjustment
burdens upon them. 40 The shift to unipolarity may alter the mix of these two lead-state tend-
encies.
If the lead state does use its unipolar position to become more of a privilege taker and to
shift adjustment burdens on others, questions emerge. How far will it move in this direction?
At what point does diminished and contested provision of public goods alter the fundament-
al character of the order? More importantly, what are the pressures and incentives that re-
main—even under conditions of unipolarity—for the leading state to provide public goods
and seek consensus over the rules and institutions of liberal hegemonic order?
Status Quo versus Revisionism
Does the shift from Cold War bipolarity to unipolarity alter the leading state's orientation to-
ward upholding the stability of the existing rules and institutions of the system? This is not
a question about renegotiating specific institutional bargains; it is about making more basic
transformations in the organizational arrangements of the international system. If the trans-
ition from bipolarity to unipolarity does represent a power shift in America's favor, will it
seek to use that power to preserve and extend the prevailing rules and institutions or seek to
transform them?
The stability of any international system depends significantly on the degree to which the
major powers are satisfied with the status quo. 41 Robert Gilpin argues that leading states
“will attempt to change the international system if the expected benefits exceed the expec-
ted costs.” 42 During the long era of bipolarity, the question of whether the cost-benefit cal-
culation of the United States favored the status quo seemed obvious. After all, the postwar
international order—that is, the Western pole within the larger bipolar system—was largely
organized and led by the United States. With the end of the Cold War, it also appeared that
the United States would remain a satisfied lead state—with overwhelming incentives to con-
solidate and extend the American-led pole under conditions of unipolarity. But is this neces-
sarily so?
Again, two alternative logics seem possible. One logic is that the unipolar state will be
a status quo power. It achieved its predominant position in an international system that was
already strongly shaped by its power and preferences. It thrives in the existing system and oc-
cupies the commanding positions of authority. The expectation is that the leading state would
 
 
 
Search WWH ::




Custom Search