Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
dominant state has the ability to bear disproportionately the costs of providing international
collective goods such as an open world economy or a stable security order. The leading state
has an interest in bearing these costs because it benefits disproportionately from promoting
systemwide outcomes that reflect its values and interests.
During the Cold War, the United States did step forward to provide public goods. It took
on the responsibilities that Charles Kindleberger argues were needed to promote international
economic stability, such as serving as an open market of last resort and allowing the use of
Western powers reinforced their security alliance against the Soviet Union. The United States
also bore disproportionately the direct costs of Western alliance security. In the background,
American support for the basic framework of postwar rules and institutions was also a type of
public goods provision. The Soviet Union, on its side of the international divide, ultimately
step further, arguing that the United States and Soviet Union may have been adversaries in
the bipolar system, but they shared, as the two dominant powers, a mutual interest in system
stability that prompted them to cooperate in providing public goods such as nuclear nonpro-
as a society of states.
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How might the shift from a bipolar system to a unipolar one affect the inclination of the
now singularly dominant state to provide international public goods? Two possible logics
present themselves. One possibility is that it would continue to provide public goods—and
even increase its responsibilities for the stability, openness, and security of the order. The
capabilities of a unipolar state relative to other major states are greater than those of either
dominant state in a bipolar system. It has more capacity to provide system services. The uni-
polar state's incentive should be stronger as well, since it now has the opportunity to influen-
ce international outcomes globally, not just in its particular subsystem. In effect, the underly-
ing logic of liberal hegemony should still obtain under conditions of unipolarity. The leading
state should try to lock in a durable international order that reflects its interests and values.
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The other possibility is the opposite logic. After the shift from Cold War bipolarity to
unipolarity, we might expect the leading state to underproduce public goods despite its pre-
ponderant capabilities. The fact that it is unthreatened by peer competitors and relatively un-
constrained by other states creates incentives for the unipolar state to pursue more parochial
interests even at the expense of a stable international order. The fact that it is extraordinarily
powerful means that it will be more inclined to force adjustment costs onto others rather than
bear disproportionate burdens itself.
It is possible that both these logics will be at play simultaneously. The unipolar state may
continue to provide public goods, but in the absence of a common threat or rival pole, the
states in the order may increasingly disagree on what public goods should be provided and on
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