Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
Consequences of Unipolarity
If counterbalancing is not the central response to the rise of unipolarity, what is? The global
system remains hierarchical, but does the character of that hierarchy change under conditions
of unipolarity, and if so in what ways? In particular, we are interested in knowing how the
shift from Cold War bipolarity to unipolarity alters the constraints and incentives on institu-
tional cooperation between the United States and other states in the system. Does the rise of
unipolarity alter the incentives for the United States to construct and operate within multilat-
eral frameworks? How does unipolarity alter the incentives for weaker and secondary states
to cooperate with the leading state? And how do these shifts change the overall character of
international order?
To ask these questions is to probe the changing logic of the institutional bargain between
a unipolar state and others around it. As I argued in chapter 3 , the state's decision whether
to operate within rule-based institutional relationships entails a basic cost-benefit calculation.
To make binding agreements is to give up policy autonomy. This is a cost states would prefer
not to bear unless doing so generates rules and institutions that yield benefits that are great-
er than the costs of lost autonomy. Benefits can entail the expected material gains that flow
from a stable, rule-based order as well as less tangible gains associated with the enhancement
of the legitimacy of the state and the wider international order it dominates. This institutional
bargaining model allows us to see how long-term shifts in power and interests can alter the
multilateral commitments of the leading state.
The rise of unipolarity is manifest in growing power advantages for the leading state, gen-
erated in part by the loss of a competing pole. The leading state has no peer competitor or
global rival. This shift in power and polarity appears to give added bargaining advantages
to the unipolar state in several ways. First, the lead state has more discretionary power re-
sources because it no longer has a security competitor. It possesses the same power resources
as before—and indeed it may increase them—but those capabilities are not now tied down in
bipolar security competition. Second, and relatedly, there are fewer external restraints on the
leading state's exercise of power because it is not being balanced by the other major states.
Power is not actively being deployed—at least on a global scale by a rival great power—to
oppose and contain the leading state. Third, secondary and weaker states no longer have an
exit option. The lead state has a near-monopoly on the global provision of security protection.
Under these circumstances, there is no escape from hierarchy under conditions of unipolar-
ity. A rival hierarchical order to which a weaker state might move does not exist. Finally, and
more generally, the unipolar state now has a more encompassing impact on the global sys-
tem. If there is to be order and the provision of public goods, the unipolar state will need to
be involved in their generation. It is harder to work around the leading state than in bipolar or
multipolar orders. Other states must therefore worry more about whether or not the leading
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