Unipolarity and Its Consequences - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 89

in 2003, it has been difficult to see systematic efforts by the other major states to actively
oppose—let alone—balance against a unipolar America. 8
Waltz acknowledges that balance-of-power dynamics can be suppressed by hegemony.
Acceptance of American hegemonic leadership, for example, has helped prevent the return of
a balance of power on the European continent. But from a realist perspective, unipolarity is
nonetheless likely to be the least durable of the various types of international order. Two reas-
ons are offered for this view. First, the dominant state willtend to take on more tasks and re-
sponsibilities, which over the long term will weaken the state. This argument echoes the thes-
is of Paul Kennedy that the United States could eventually go the way of all powers—down.
Dominant states tend to make mistakes in the exercise of their power, a problem that emerges
directly from its concentration. 9 The other reason why unipolar order is unstable follows dir-
ectly from the underlying condition of anarchy: even if the dominant state acts with mod-
eration, other states will fear the insecurities of unchecked concentrated power. During the
Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union restrained each other, but today the United
States is largely unrestrained. As Waltz argues, “Faced with unbalanced power, some states
try to increase their own strength or they ally with others to bring the international distribu-
tion of power back into balance.” 10 Regardless of its good intentions or eagerness to please,
the United States is destined to experience the same fate of other dominant states in world
history.
But contrary to this view, there are deeply rooted reasons why large-scale balancing
against American unipolarity has not occurred. One reason is that even if the great powers
wanted to balance, it is hard to do. 11 It is costly to mobilize a countercoalition, particularly
when the threat is not that of immediate territorial conquest. At one level, it is a problem of
collective action. States would ideally like other states to do the balancing, thereby saving
themselves the costs of mobilizing power and building coalitions and incurring risks of re-
taliation from the unipolar state. That is, there is a tendency to engage in “buck passing.” 12 It
is also difficult to build coalitions because states do not all experience the threats of domina-
tion to the same degree. As Wohlforth suggests, states often think about their security in very
local terms, and therefore systemwide balancing imperatives are not likely to be as intensely
felt by state leaders. The loss of policy autonomy in such coalitions also makes balancing co-
alitions costly. It can also be dangerous. If balancing is attempted but fails, the dominant state
can exact reprisals. These inherent constraints make balancing difficult to produce—and in
fact, across historical eras, there are many instances where states underbalance even in the
face of what appear to be substantial threats emerging from a rising or dominant state. 13
Wohlforth, however, goes beyond these organizational problems to argue that the stability
of unipolarity is actually locked into the system by the deep structure of unipolar power,
which generates a clear and durable array of costs, benefits, and constraints that reinforce the
existing order. When material power capabilities are as concentrated as they are under condi-