Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
from wildlife tourism (Crawford, 2000). This revenue provided rural infrastruc-
ture and increased household incomes by 15-25 per cent in rural areas - and led
to reduced poaching and improved attitudes to wildlife (Weaver, 1998,
Scheyvens, 2002). Between 1989 and 2001, US$10 million was paid in dividends
to local communities (46 per cent of revenue earned) (Jonga, 2003). Ninety-three
per cent of this was from sport hunting leases, and 2 per cent from tourism leases
(Maveneke et al, 1998). Not surprisingly, the hunting options were more popular
than photographic tourism due to their higher returns, and lower infrastructure
requirements (Baker, 1997, Buckley, 2003, Murphree, 2003). However, some of
the conflicts that arose included the uneven distribution of benefits, disagree-
ments between parties about the control of income by RDCs and local elites, and
the lack of compensation for crop damage or livestock lost to wildlife (Alexander
and McGregor, 2000; Manwa, 2003; Virtane, 2003). Political turmoil since 2000,
inflation and unemployment and the resettlement of people in protected and
wildlife areas affected CAMPFIRE. Over the years, the RDCs have harvested
their natural resources and earned income in the following ways: leasing trophy
hunting concessions, utilizing forestry and forest products, leasing ecotourism
sites and from live animal sales (Muchapondwa, 2003).
From 1989, the income from safari hunting increased rapidly to US$2 million
annually. In terms of Zimbabwe's economy, the multiplier on trophy fees is
approximately 3, suggesting that CAMPFIRE areas generated for Zimbabwe a
direct annual income from hunting of US$6.0 million. During the period under
review, CAMPFIRE areas earned US$20.3 million, and Muir-Leresche et al
(2003) estimate that this earned over US$100 million for Zimbabwe. In addition
to direct fees to communities, a proportion of safari operating expenses is paid
locally as wages and salaries (some US$0.5 million annually), and for the
purchase of materials, but this is not captured in CAMPFIRE monitoring
records; neither are peripheral economic benefits such as taxidermy, travel,
extended tourism activities, food, etc. (Child et al, 2003). The extremely rapid
growth up to 1994 can be attributed to two factors (see Figure 7.3): (1) a steady
increase in quotas as, initially, more areas were designated for CAMPFIRE and,
later, as wildlife populations began to grow; and (2) a significant improvement in
marketing activities.
11
While the data indicate that CAMPFIRE continued to market its hunting
well, in the last three years the parallel exchange rate has disrupted the levels of
community incomes and is a serious threat to the programme. In 2001 and
2002, safari operators generally paid for hunting at the official exchange rate of
55, compared to the parallel rate of Z$500 and Z$1500. The communities'
incomes were therefore less than 10 per cent of what they should have been. In
many areas, this situation continued into 2003. Some RDCs have begun to
adjust, but are still getting less than a third of the real value of their hunting
(Child et al, 2003).
An overview of the benefits, including those from wildlife tourism and
hunting are indicated in Table 7.6, in addition to the number of households in the
wards and districts concerned. Most revenues from tourism in Zimbabwe's
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