Agriculture Reference
In-Depth Information
economies of Europe. Consequently, a problem of surplus production began to arise.
US agriculture under industrialization was, it seemed, just too productive. At some
point in the 1960s, a similar dynamic emerged in the UK/Europe as agricultural pro-
ductivity surged and subsidized production of key commodities moved into surplus.
From this point the phenomenon of 'grain stokpiles', 'buter mountains' and even
'wine lakes' became a problem for European politicians to confront. In both the US
and the European case, however, there was no sense that things had overshot the
mark. Rather, this new, highly productive domestic agriculture sector was seen as
creating all sorts of new strategic and political opportunities.
This new dynamic of surplus food production on both sides of the Atlantic cre-
ated what Friedmann and McMihael (1989) initially termed the 'Second Food Re-
gime', but later also termed the 'Cold War' or 'Aid-Based Food Regime'. Several au-
thors, including Susan George in
How the Other Half Dies
(1976), identify the US
legislation PL480 (later termed the 'Food for Peace' law) and its various subsequent
revisions as symbolically demonstrating this major shift in world agricultural rela-
tions. hrough PL480, the US (with parallel mehanisms later implemented by the
UK/Europe) began to use the instrument of food aid as an element of foreign policy.
Surplus food production in the Developed Countries was not only sold to the Devel-
oping World, but it also began to be distributed widely as aid. Food aid became a
key element in the development project for these societies through enabling the rural
peasantry (who were no longer required to produce quite so muh food) to migrate
to new urban mega-cities (where they could be fed by subsidized grain imports and
gifts from places like the USA). Within a few years of the passing of PL480, around
a quarter of all US grain exports were taking place under the auspices of suh aid
programmes.
Needless to say, this dramatic new initiative became part of a wider set of Cold
War strategies to win (or coerce) the support of Developing World countries - many
now ex-colonies - for either side. Whereas in the early 1950s, strategists had calcu-
lated the number of days of available food supply in Western Europe, within a dec-
ade the key strategy had shifted towards the most creative use of food surpluses. As
George (1976) documents, a suspiciously large number of the key recipients of PL480
aid were mainly notable for being Western allies during the Cold War (like Pakistan)
rather than for actually featuring on the UN list of food deficit countries.
One essential element within the Second Food Regime whih Friedmann and
McMihael (1989) and Friedmann (1990, 1993) identiied also supports a key conten-
