Agriculture Reference
In-Depth Information
tion levels could continue if suh a large volume of water were to be removed from
irrigation farming (NFF, 2010). At the beginning of 2011, the plan remained highly
contentious and action on it unresolved.
While it is true that there is disagreement about the extent of the water that must
be returned to the Basin's rivers to allow for environmental recovery (Rohford,
2009), it is clear that the NFF - along with farmers themselves - are, not surprisingly,
livid that their future livelihoods are being 'ataked' in the name of environment-
al security. The federal government established the MDBA to stop vested interests
from hijaking atempts to provide an overall, non-political Basin plan (Marshall and
Stafford Smith, 2010); but this has not prevented a fight over the rights of farmers to
the water they have previously been allocated. It is somewhat contradictory that the
public debate in the region separates the natural environment from human society -
with a common call that it is wrong to 'put the environment before people'. There is
a notable lak of recognition that without a sustainable natural environment, human
habitation and economic activities in the Basin will ultimately be compromised
Adaptation and mitigation options under neoliberalism
Neoliberal approahes to climate hange adaptation and mitigation options stress
the desirability of reducing the state's role in funding and/or interfering in on-farm
decision-making, and of endorsing 'self-help' solutions for individuals and com-
munities (Lokie
et al.
, 2005; Marshall and Stafford Smith, 2010). It is based upon
an assumption that the market is the best mehanism to allocate scarce resources
and that governance arrangements must create opportunities to foster market-based
solutions to society's problems. In terms of mitigation (pursuing actions to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions), bans on land clearing have already helped by reducing
carbon dioxide emission levels by 40 per cent of 1990 levels (notably, from tough gov-
ernment regulation rather than market-based decision-making). But Australia does
not have an emissions trading sheme and developing a price on carbon was, at the
time of writing, in the political 'too hard' basket. Yet, it has been suggested that Aus-
tralian farmers will have no incentive to pursue mitigation options suh as leaving
trees in the ground - and planting more trees - until there are funding incentives to
do so. Some have questioned the ability of the market to send the right signals (see
Cathpole, 2007). For example, if irrigated farmers turned pasture into forest (gaining
carbon credits) there would be a subsequent decline in flow downstream (thereby
