Cryptography Reference
In-Depth Information
i
q
r i
s i
t i
−−
1
86063528783122081
1
0
−−
0
14772019882186053
0
1
1
5
12203429372191816
1
5
2
1
2568590509994237
1
6
3
4
1929067332214868
5
29
4
1
639523177779369
6
35
5
3
10497798876761
23
134
6
60
9655245173709
138
8075
7
1
842553703052
1409
8209
One sees that d is found in only 7 steps.
Exercise
24.5.4
Consider
the
RSA
public
key
( N,e )
=
(11068562742977 ,
10543583750987). Use the Wiener attack to determine the private key.
Exercise 24.5.5 Show how to perform the Wiener attack when ϕ ( N ) is replaced by λ ( N ).
What is the bound on the size of d for which the attack works?
Exercise 24.5.6 Let ( N,e )
=
(63875799947551 , 4543741325953) be an RSA public key
where N
=
pq with gcd( p
1 ,q
1) > 2 and small private exponent d such that ed
1(mod λ ( N )). Use the Wiener attack to find d .
Exercise 24.5.7 Show that one can prevent the Wiener attack by adding a sufficiently large
multiple of ϕ ( N )to e .
Wiener's result has been extended in several ways. Dujella [ 170 ] and Verheul and van
Tilborg [ 557 ] show how to extend the range of d while still using Euclid's algorithm. Their
algorithms are exponential time. Boneh and Durfee [ 73 ] used lattices to extend the attack
to d<N 0 . 284 and, with significant further work, extended the range to d<N 0 . 292 .Blomer
and May [ 66 ] give a simpler formulation of the Boneh-Durfee attack for d<N 0 . 284 .
24.5.2 Small CRT private exponents
As mentioned in Section 24.1.1 , a common way to speed up RSA decryption is to use
the Chinese remainder theorem. Indeed, one can choose the CRT private exponents d p
and d q to be small (subject to d p
d q (mod gcd( p
1 ,q
1)) and define e such that
ed p
d q ,or
else one can just apply the Wiener attack. We now show that these values cannot be taken
to be too small.
1(mod p
1) and ed q
1(mod q
1). Of course, one should take d p =
Exercise 24.5.8 Give a brute-force attack on small private CRT exponents.
We now present a “birthday attack”, which is attributed to Pinch in [ 442 ]. Let d p be such
that ed p
1(mod p
1) and ed p
1(mod q
1). Suppose we know that 1 <d p <K
 
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