Cryptography Reference
In-Depth Information
tool and the corruption brought by power is one of the oldest themes.
Both of these scenarios are embodied in one case that came along
in the year before I began writing the first edition of the topic. The
story began when a NewOrleans woman looked out the window and
saw a police officer beating her son's friend. She called the Internal
Affairs department to report the officer. By lunchtime, the officer in
question knew the name of the person making the accusation, her
address, and even what she was wearing. He allegedly ordered a hit
and by the end of the day, she was dead.
How do we know this happened? How do we know it wasn't a ran-
dom case of street violence? Federal authorities were in NewOrleans
following the officer and bugging his phone. He was a suspect in a
ring of corrupt cops who helped the drug trade remain secure. They
audiotaped the order for the hit.
There is little doubt that secure communications could have
made this case unsolvable. If no one had heard the execution order
except the killer, there would be no case and no justice.
There is also little doubt that a secure Internal Affairs office could
have prevented the murder. That leak probably came from a col-
league, but the corrupt cops could have monitored the phones of
the Internal Affairs division. That scenario is quite conceivable. At
the very least, the murder would have been delayed until a case was
made against the officer. The right to confront our accusers in court
means that it would have been impossible to keep her identity secret
forever.
Which way is the right way? Total openness stops many crimes,
but it encourages others forms of fraud and deceit. Total secrecy
protects many people, but it gives criminals a cover.
In the past, the FBI and other parts of the law enforcement com-
munity suggested a system known as “key escrow” as a viable com-
promise. The escrow systems broadcast a copy of the session key in
an encrypted packet that can only be read by designated people. Al-
One solution is to
encrypt the session key
with a special public
key. Only the
government has access
to the private key.
though Department of Justice officials have described extensive con-
trols on the keys and on access to them, I remain unconvinced that
there will not be abuse. If the tool is going to be useful to the police
on the streets, they'll need fast access to keys. The audit log will only
reveal a problem if someone complains that their phone was tapped
illegally. But how do you know your phone was tapped? Only if you
discover the tapes someone's hands.
There really is no way for technology to provide any ultimate so-
lution to this problem. At some point, law enforcement authorities
must be given the authority to listen in to solve a crime. The more
this ability is concentrated in a small number of hands, the more
