Robotics Reference
In-Depth Information
Suber argues that robots
...withunpredictablemotivationswouldserveourneedsmuchless
effectively and efficiently than we intended when we programmed
them. While this might be a good reason to limit a machine's free-
dom, implementing this limitation is not paternalistic. The reason
is simply that this limitation on liberty is designed to prevent harm
to others, while paternalism limits liberty in order to prevent self-
harm. [2]
Suber discusses various ways in which self-modification can result in self-
harm. A robot might change its desires to a form it would originally have
found regrettable, harmful, or even despicable. It might turn itself into a
vile creature but one that accepts its new standards and enjoys being vile.
If those harms are deep and accidental, or when they render the machine
incapable of repairing itself or giving a valid consent to be repaired, then
those who love the machine will feel a paternalistic temptation. If an
intelligent machine of good will could botch its self-modification and
leave itself impaired or miserable, then arguably we have a duty to step
in and prevent this outcome. There is an obvious sense in which this
will diminish the machine's freedom, but the harm of diminished liberty
caused by paternalism is less than the harm of self-mutilation.
The Legal Rights of Robots
From a legal perspective it may seem nonsensical to even begin con-
sidering computers, robots, or the more advanced humanoids, in
any terms but that of inanimate objects, subject to present laws.
However, it would have been equally “nonsensical” for an individ-
ual living in many ancient civilizations a few millennia ago to think
in legal terms of slaves as other than chattel.
Notwithstanding certain obvious biological differences between
these two cases, for purposes of law those civilizations could hardly
have cared less that a slave bled the same way as his masters, for
their legal definition of “humanness” was based essentially on their
conceptions of mind, intelligence and moral understanding—char-
acteristics which the slave supposedly lacked. Similarly, by our
present legal definitions robots too
must
lack such traits, but this
may be more a matter of antiquated semantics than (potential)
physical reality. Just as the slave gradually assumed a more “hu-
man” legal character with rights and duties relative to freemen, so
