Environmental Engineering Reference
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expanded, and Beijing has built its sixth ring road at 15-20 km from the city centre. Land
development pressures have followed, with much greater demand for development in outer
areas, and trips have become longer and less focused on the radial commute. Over one-third
of trips are now taken by car, with a dramatic decline in cycling, even though bus use remains
largely unchanged. A changed policy approach was partly developed prior to the 2008 Olympics,
as several new metro, light rail and BRT lines were built. Traffic demand management has
become more important, and during the Olympics a license plate scheme was used to restrict
50 per cent of vehicles from travelling in central areas (i.e. the commute by car was only
allowed on alternate days). There is popular and political support to extend the scheme, but
as a one-day-a-week variant (a 20 per cent regime), similar to that used in Mexico City and
São Paulo (Darido et al., 2009).
Some important lessons, and also lessons, can be drawn from experience in Japan, where
the rise in car mobility has been managed in a different way to the conventional US and, to
a lesser extent, the European model. Domestic consumption of the private car was controlled
until the national motor vehicle manufacturing industry was in a position to capture the majority
of market. General Motors and Ford were forced to leave Japan in 1939, and thereafter
economic nationalism and the promotion of domestic firms translated into policies supporting
rail and subway infrastructure. These tended to be domestically manufactured, and relied on
hydropower and coal which were domestically supplied (oil was 98 per cent imported). The
devalued if urban dispersal was encouraged, and no interests in the motor industry. As late
as 1956, the road between Tokyo and Osaka remained unpaved in sections. In the 1970s a
concerted effort was made by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry to encourage
motor manufacturing and the keiretsu became involved. Government investments and subsidy
increased markedly, including three ring roads around Tokyo alone, and motorisation increased
rapidly (Hook and Replogle, 1996). In contrast, in the USA and Europe the development
model was to encourage motorisation as part of the auto-industrial complex, including the
motor industry, road construction companies, oil companies and development industry (Freund
and Martin, 1993).
Mobility infrastructures and ensuing travel patterns are associated with a complex process
of policy development, and can be shaped in various directions according to strategic objectives.
It is not by coincidence that some countries and cities are associated with car-based mobility
patterns and others with public transport, walking or cycling or hybrid forms. We should
perhaps remember the scale of the automotive industry internationally:
if counted like a country it would be the sixth largest economy in the world, with an
equivalent turnover of US$2 trillion, supporting an estimated nine million direct jobs and
50 million supplier jobs, and contributing US$400 billion to governments in tax.
(Wells et al., 2012, p. 127)
In view of this scale, perhaps it is unlikely that a few well-meaning environmentalists,
academics, politicians and interested members of the public can be sufficiently organised to
catalyse major change in the transport system unless the industry is in support of this. The
lessons for China are that motorisation can be managed, and public transport, walking and
cycling encouraged, but only by a very clear and strong policy approach. A strong motor
manufacturing industry, which is already a reality in China, is likely to lobby for the success
of their business model. This is likely to be similar to the lines of the auto-industrial complex
in the West, encouraging dispersed urban structure, low vehicle tax bases and fuel prices, and
