Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
in a deliberately ambiguous manner. This suited the superpowers. Article 4 was a subtle act
of hegemonic power. There was no need, after all, for either the US or the Soviet Union to
initiate an actual claim to Antarctica.
The treaty was available for signing some six weeks after the opening presentations by
heads of delegations. We should acknowledge the role of restraint and absence in securing
such a speedy agreement. There were very real tensions between the parties. Sovereignty
was a major obstacle, and for countries such as Argentina and, to a lesser extent, Chile, the
idea that the country should 'sign away' its papal inheritance was unthinkable. There was
a very real danger that the Argentine delegation would simply walk away or, further down
the ratification track, discover that the Argentine parliament would refuse to accede to the
treaty. Argentine parliamentarians understood that the treaty was cementing the authority
of the US in particular to circumvent the sovereignty politics of Antarctica. So Article 4,
however clever and open-ended, was not a magic bullet in itself. It had to be negotiated
and accepted within the domestic territories of the twelve states. The entry into force of
the treaty was not certain on 1 December 1959 because every signatory had to confirm that
accession was completed domestically. And Argentina was crucial given its claimant-state
status and involvement in the most contested part of the Antarctic. All the parties, whether
by design and/or major initiative" aid="Caccident, managed to display some form of re-
straint from aggressive territorial nationalism, not to mention the disciplinary constraints
of Cold War antagonism.
The other factor at play here was absence. Resources were not discussed, formally at least,
at the Washington Conference. In large part, this was due to the fact that the sovereignty
question inevitably raised issues pertaining to the ownership of onshore and offshore re-
sources. Unlike India, no one mobilized a view of the Antarctic as an under-exploited re-
source frontier. The spectre of resources was never far from those discussions, however.
Public awareness of the Antarctic was far higher now, and stories alerting readers of untold
riches awaiting discovery and exploitation were legion. The Antarctic's living resource po-
tential was immense, and whaling now fell under the remit of the International Whaling
Commission (established in 1946). In non-living resource terms, evidence abounded of
mineral potential, even if a combination of distance, remoteness, and inaccessibility made
it an unlikely short-term development. The point was as much about future possibilities and
possible futures. The delegates at Washington recognized that resource use and manage-
ment would have to be tackled at a later date.
