Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
lighting the potential for ecological restoration to provide basic resource needs for
people.
Power relationships are extremely important in such efforts (Boyce, Narain, and
Stanton 2007) because in nearly all cases these people are pushing back against op-
pression and exploitation of local resources by others, attempting to improve their sit-
uation, and using ecological restoration (as they define it) as one of their tools to do so.
Being able to participate and find ways into avenues of power (“democratizing ac-
cess”) that allow such efforts to move forward is key and often requires restorationists
to act as conduits between the disenfranchised and those in power. In addition,
restorationists can work with local groups to find alternative, and often traditional,
ways to restore their lands and livelihoods (Kimmerer, Stevens, Rotherham).
Power, Economics, and Natural Capital
Economies, because they are the intersection of human needs and natural resource
supplies, are also the nexus of politics, power, and wealth. As ecological restoration
has become a mainstream activity, its practitioners have felt the effects of this power
center. Indeed, at least one optimistic account describes the emergence of a “restora-
tion economy” (Cunningham 2002). The chapters in the economics section, as well
as the chapters by Abrams, Baker and Quinn-Davidson, and Rotherham, provide sev-
eral perspectives about how this “economy” works in the United States, England, and
South Africa. Largely promoted and supported by government policies and subsidies,
the current “restoration economy” is often dependent on the support of powerful in-
terests, politicians, and bureaucracies for activities such as wetland restoration, urban
restoration, and forest restoration. As Baker and Quinn-Davidson note in their case
study from northern California, this dependence of government power and money
has led small restoration businesses there to consolidate or go extinct; to adapt their
original goals and change their organizational size or lose economic support. Abrams
outlines similar concerns about scale in his depiction of the White Mountain Stew-
ardship Contract in Arizona. Meanwhile, Blignaut and colleagues report on a largely
unsuccessful government attempt to bring better economic conditions to a poor, rural
population in South Africa. Buckley and Holl take a more theoretical, although quite
useful, approach to such matters in their discussion of game theory tools and restora-
tion scenarios. Each of these accounts suggests that these economic power relation-
ships are often ephemeral and subject to swings in market conditions, and they may
create, rather than resolve, tensions between local interests and government entities.
That said, efforts of this type should still be encouraged, and ways to make them more
sustainable should be found.
In addition to being a nexus of power, economies are designed to increase wealth.
Political systems, because they are intricately tied to economies and power, have the
ability to distribute wealth and, ultimately, power. In theory, democracies should be
politically about sharing power, whereas socialist structures are tuned so as to share
wealth. As many democracies (e.g., United States, western Europe, Australia) are also
tied to so-called free market economies, they fail to share either power or wealth
