Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
For restoration projects, if broader landscape-scale ecological benefits are iden-
tifiable with cooperation, and cooperation has been difficult to achieve, restoration
planners should consider how bargaining-type, cooperative solutions might allow
achieving previously unattainable outcomes. The ecological functions on areas of
low-intensity agriculture have been considered justification for efforts, potentially in-
cluding payments, to prevent escalation to high-intensity agriculture with fewer eco-
logical functions (Bakker and Berendse 1999). Bargaining approaches can be used to
identify the types and level of compromise necessary to achieve outcomes better than
the alternative.
Quantitative and Qualitative Applications
Methods from game theory can be most readily applied when measures of costs and
benefits are quantified, but they can also be applied when impacts are ranked. Back-
ward induction can typically be applied as long as preference rankings at each deci-
sion node are available. When information is incomplete and a probabilistic treat-
ment is necessary, but quantitative values are not available, more judgment might be
necessary to assess impact on preferences of relative weightings. This should not
preclude the application of systematically assessing decision interactions with game-
theoretic methods. In reality, this sort of qualitative application of methods and gen-
eral lessons is a useful and frequently applied aspect of game theory for restoration.
While not explicitly described as game-theoretic methods, several processes for
management of ecological restoration involve elements described in this chapter.
Adaptive management systems are now commonplace in restoration (e.g., Murray
and Marmorek 2003), and while the iterative process might not necessarily begin with
a strategic perspective, learning over time allows anticipation of opportunities for im-
proved social interaction. Decision analysis involves similar structuring of decisions to
game theory, but with moves limited to nature rather than other decision makers, at
least not in terms of interactive decision making. Decision trees and probabilistic as-
sessment of choices have informed restoration efforts (e.g., Cipolini, Maruyama, and
Zimmerman 2005), and the extension to multiple decision makers is natural.
One of the authors (M.B.) is involved in applying game theory to various restora-
tion efforts to avoid unintended consequences from certain stakeholder groups. For
example, in southern Utah, efforts to restore certain watersheds are attempting to rein-
troduce beavers (
castor canadensis
). Beavers were extirpated and had their dams re-
moved in part because of the belief that they capture water and reduce downstream
flow. The reintroduction efforts must determine the actual effects on stakeholders,
find ways to communicate those effects when they are net positive, and find ways to
avoid undesirable outcomes, such as beaver dams in irrigation ditches. In Portland,
Oregon, we have worked to identify strategies to restore water quality through residen-
tial stormwater capture. Residential stormwater capture systems must be designed for
individual homeowners that provide private benefits (including feelings of civic duty)
sufficient to justify the private costs in order to elicit the public water quality benefits.
