Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
Chapter 17
Game Theory Tools for Improving Ecological
Restoration Outcomes
MARK BUCKLEY AND KAREN HOLL
Successful restoration and maintenance of ecological functions often requires under-
standing local decision making and behavior, as discussed in the introductory and
subsequent chapters of this volume. Furthermore, successfully completing and main-
taining most restoration projects requires participation and cooperation from a range
of stakeholders, including local and state government agencies and officials, and local
businesses and neighboring landowners.
Several fields of human and social analysis consider decision making and behav-
ior. The field of economics usually starts from a set of assumptions based on limited
resources, trade-offs, and rational (self-interested) actors. Some uses of limited natural
resources, particularly consumptive uses, preclude ecological functions and processes
that, among other things, provide ecosystem goods and services to society (Daily
1997). Due to new awareness and potentially new value from these ecosystem goods
and services, some communities decide the losses of these goods and services are no
longer justified. These reversal decisions leading to restoration projects are not always
unanimously supported throughout the community, and conflicts can arise. Under-
standing individual decision making and behavior that runs counter to restoration
goals can help to identify restoration strategies that account for these dynamics and
avoid unintended consequences.
Game theory, in its application as a field of economics, provides quantitative ana-
lytical techniques specific to individual decision making, particularly for situations in
which decisions by individuals interact and determine outcomes. Many insights have
come from analyzing very simple situations, such as deciding where to eat or how to
meet up with someone (without cell phones), that have been usefully applied to
much more complex problems. Game theory research intensified during the Cold
War in attempts to understand international conflicts, particularly those potentially
involving nuclear weapons (Schelling 1960). Game-theoretic analyses have since ex-
panded to consider situations in business, politics, sociology, biology, and more (e.g.,
Casson 1994; Gintis 2000). Thomas Schelling, winner of the 2005 Nobel Prize in
Economic Sciences and close adviser to several U.S. presidents during the Cold War
era, has said his recommendations for perilous situations, such as the Cuban Missile
