Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
fundamental in evaluating the benefits and costs of our economic activities. Absolute
limits of our economic activities need to be recognized if humans are going to have a
long and happy life, rather than a short and eventful one. Georgescu-Roegen put it suc-
cinctly in 1975 when he wrote, “Every time we produce a Cadillac, we do it at the cost
of decreasing the number of human lives in the future” (Georgescu-Roegen 1993). In
this sense, the economic principle that “rational people think at the margin” (Mankiw
2001) is only valid when the context and scale of the decision are clearly predefined.
Unfortunately, the context and scale of decisions have the most clarity when one's
livelihood is imminently threatened (e.g., wildfire is approaching, water is too polluted
for use, etc.); they are often less clearly defined in the postnormal world we inhabit.
REACTIVITY AND PROACTIVITY
In a capitalistic society, land management often boils down to the collective will of
self-interested, rational individuals operating at the margin with the purpose of maxi-
mizing their own utility. This often translates into the necessary reactive action when
we finally have all the information after the fact. Putting out a wildfire becomes
clearly rational, both individually and collectively, once the fire threatens life and
property. The rationality of a more proactive approach to reduce fuel loading in the
neighboring forests is not always so clear to individuals with imperfect information.
Investigating the role and value of improved information has been an active research
area in agricultural and forest economics. Amacher et al. (2005) estimated that forest
owners who underestimate both fire risk and efficacy of fuel treatment can double
their expected rent by having more accurate information. Indeed, lack of information
for individual decision makers can lead to substantial private and social losses from
forest fires (Amacher et al. 2006). Likewise, game theory applied in economics can
provide an analytical framework to predict collective outcomes when interactions
among individual decisions determine the outcomes. Chapter 17 in this volume pre-
sents an analytical model for applying game theory in ecological restoration projects.
Certainly it is an important policy goal to gather reliable information, improve ac-
cess, and provide incentives for individuals to incorporate better information and co-
operate with others. However, we also need to recognize that a complete set of in-
formation for any given decision is often an unattainable goal, especially when we
are faced with a high degree of uncertainty and irreversibility in decisions with far-
reaching and long-lasting consequences. A proactive approach is useful when trying
to anticipate the inevitability and fix the root problems that cause and exacerbate the
impacts to social and economic interests stemming from degraded ecosystems. This
notion of ecological restoration requires a shared vision among community members
that can prompt action, even without full, complete information and strategies, to
deal with an inherently unpredictable future. Unfortunately, the fundamental differ-
ences between risk, uncertainty, and inherent ignorance (radical uncertainty) have
not been well understood in economics and other decision sciences (Ludwig 2001).
To the question, Is ecological restoration a rational choice?, we can only offer
a typical answer from economists: It depends. Supporting an ecological restoration
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