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The Life of Concepts: An ABM of Conceptual Drift
in Social Groups
Enrique Canessa
1
, Sergio Chaigneau
2
, and Ariel Quezada
3
1
Facultad de Ingeniería y Ciencias & Centro de Investigación de la Cognición
Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, Balmaceda 1625, Recreo, Viña del Mar, Chile
2
Escuela de Psicología & Centro de la Investigación de la Cognición
Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, Diagonal Las Torres 2640, Peñalolén, Santiago, Chile
3
Escuela de Psicología & Centro de la Investigación de la Cognición
Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, Balmaceda 1625, Recreo, Viña del Mar, Chile
{ecanessa,sergio.chaigneau,ariel.quezada}@uai.cl
Abstract.
Based on the premise that conceptual agreement (i.e., feeling that we
share an idea with others) is always inferential, we develop an ABM that
models the conditions under which a concept will gain or loose strength in the
minds of individuals. The ABM is based on simple assumptions, generally
consistent with psychological and philosophical analyses on the subject. We
assume that different members of a population have slightly different versions
of one similar conceptualization, that inferred agreement may be true or
illusory, and that a concept that promotes agreement (true or illusory) increases
its strength. Our analyses (simulated experiments and probability models) test
the influence of several variables on the fate of a concept (i.e., whether it
strengthens or weakens in the minds of individuals), and support the conclusion
that the most important parameters are the probabilities of true and illusory
agreement afforded by the concept.
Keywords:
Agent-based modelling, Shared meaning, Conceptual content,
Markov chain.
1
Introduction
Concepts appear to have a life-cycle in the cultures in which they exist. Concepts are
born at a certain point in time, spread or not through culture, and die out. Our view
here is that the fate of concepts in culture depends on their usefulness, and that a
concept is useful when it generates episodes of shared meaning, thus allowing social
cohesion and the coordination of behaviour. Given that meaning is something that
happens in individual minds, how is it possible that people agree about a meaning?
Psychological inquiry often assumes that meaning is shared by resorting to direct
reference, i.e., by pointing to the referred object, rather than by describing it [1], [2],
[3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8] and [9]. Though this approach may work for concrete objects,
it does not solve the problem of how people agree about the meaning of diffuse
objects (abstract entities like, e.g., democracy, womanhood, happiness). Direct
