The Political Economy of Regulation of Biotechnology in Agriculture - The Oxford Topic of Food, Politics, and Society - page 691

White-Stevens, then a biochemist at American Cyanamid, stated: “If man were to fol-
low the teachings of Miss Carson, we would return to the Dark Ages, and the insects
and diseases and vermin would once again inherit the earth.”12 In a letter to Dwight
D. Eisenhower, former secretary of agriculture Ezra Taft Benson reportedly concluded
that because she was unmarried, despite being physically attractive, she was “probably
a Communist.”13 These comments mimic those surrounding the global debate on the
use of transgenic crops today, including personal attacks on those not embracing the
agri-industrial model of agriculture, which is the dominant paradigm that drives cur-
rent US agricultural policy.
In the 1960s, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) was responsible
for both regulating pesticides and promoting the welfare of the agriculture industry,
making for a clear conflict of interest. In response, the EPA was established in 1970
during the Nixon administration. Its mission was to address the environmental issues
arising from industry, agriculture, and pest control programs. Much of the regulatory
framework that strictly controls the use of synthetic inputs to agricultural systems was
developed by the EPA under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act.14
A significant early outcome was the ban on the use of DDT for insect control in 1972.
Several chemicals, including methyl bromide and atrazine, have been banned widely
across the globe. However, in the United States, farmers continue to use these chemicals
under a special exemption issued by the EPA. Methyl bromide is a fumigant that is used
to control insects, termites, rodents, weeds, nematodes, and soil-borne diseases. Methyl
bromide is also a powerful ozone depleting compound that was slated to be banned in
the United States by 2005. However, this date has been pushed forward repeatedly as
farmers insist that no viable alternatives exist, particularly for control of nematodes and
soil-borne fungal and bacterial pathogens.
As evidence and awareness of the hazards resulting from pesticide use continued to
mount, rejection of their use by some farmers followed. Those choosing not to use syn-
thetic inputs began organizing under the banner of organic agriculture (see Larsson,
this volume, for the rise of the transnational organic movement), a practice in which the
use of fertilizers, pesticides, and other synthetic inputs are not permitted. The history
of agriculture in the United States shows that those who have chosen not to adopt these
technologies have been increasingly marginalized by the inability to compete with the
high yields obtained by adopters. Higher yields on conventional farms led to sharply
decreased commodity prices and a downward economic spiral ensued. The mantra
became “Get Big or Get Out” (Krebs 1992; Hauter 2012). In addition to economies of
scale, it is important to note that large US corporate farms have also benefited because
they have largely not been held accountable for the environmental costs associated with
this form of production (referred to by economists as “externalities”); rather, the US tax-
payer has, or, in the absence of paying the costs, the environment has paid the price. In
contrast, an explicit goal of the organic farming movement is to maintain and enhance
the environment on the farm and its surrounding areas, where farmers bear the costs
associated with environmental protection themselves.15 Co-existence16 between neigh-
boring farms became increasingly strained as evidence mounted that synthetic inputs