The Political Economy of Regulation of Biotechnology in Agriculture - The Oxford Topic of Food, Politics, and Society - page 664

or bureaucrats (Romer and Rosenthal, 1979). The median voter model (Downs, 1957)
can be used to analyze the behavior of different categories of voters, including presi-
dential, legislative, local elections, or referenda. Similarly, a number of theories have
been advanced by economists and political scientists to explain the behavior of regu-
lators and the shape and strength of the policies they make (see Rausser, Swinnen and
Zusman 2012). Such theories take into account the influence that groups of regulated
economic agents have on regulators and have promulgated popular concepts, such as
the “capture theory” (Posner, 1974). More sophisticated models have been designed
to accommodate multiple features of political systems (Becker, 1983; Grossman and
Helpman, 2001). There is a large body of literature that empirically evaluates alter-
native theories of political economy. Anderson, Rausser, and Swinnen (2013) docu-
ment the major evolution of agricultural policies around the world since the 1950s
and their implications on the welfare of various groups in the economy. They inter-
pret these changes in light of the findings of the various political-economic frame-
works. Most of these frameworks reduce to policymakers or a regulator who weighs
the influence of the range of politically salient groups within the economy, i.e.,
groups that have managed to solve their internal collective action problems and are
well-enough informed with respect to their likely costs or benefits arising from the
regulations in question. A few scholars have developed political-economic models
in a dynamic setting to explain long-run survival and growth of groups (Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson, 2005).
Literature on the Politics of Agricultural
Biotechnology Policies
The types of policies that impact the innovation and adoption of new agricultural
technologies, like agricultural biotechnology, include public research investments,
intellectual property policies, trade policies, and a range of environmental, biosafety,
food-safety, and product-labeling requirements (Paarlberg, 2001). Prakash and
Kollman (2003) argue that internal domestic politics in North America and in Europe
caused agricultural biotechnology policies to diverge. In Europe, slow progress of mem-
ber states in agreeing upon and implementing coordinated regulations was the direct
cause of the halting of new product approvals in 1998. Some have argued that govern-
ment regulators, particularly in the United States, were too closely aligned with the reg-
ulated industry, as individuals rotated between industry and government, thus putting
the interests of companies like Monsanto before those of the public (Newell and Glover,
2003; Seelye, 2001). Meanwhile, others have contended that regulators, particularly in
Europe, capitulated to the tactics of political activists and thus reflect the agendas of
organizations, such as Greenpeace or Friends of the Earth, more than they do the actual
welfare of farmers or working class consumers (Byrne, 2006; Gilland, 2006; Miller and
Conko, 2004).