The Politics of Food Labeling and Certification - The Oxford Topic of Food, Politics, and Society - page 626

Critiques
Not all observers are convinced that ethical labeling initiatives are living up to their
promises in terms of the impact they claim to have on the producers and the produc-
tion process. Although many critiques of the purported impact of certification on farm-
ers, farms, and food are specific to individual labeling initiatives, some critiques span all
standards, particularly those that raise doubts about transparency and accountability,
the use of price premiums, the tension between ethical and market imperatives, and the
way in which standards might reinforce North-South power relations.
Perhaps the most common generalized doubt reflects skepticism about the extent to
which labeling organizations are able to overcome logistical and structural barriers to
ensuring transparency and consistent monitoring, and, therefore, to guarantee adher-
ence to standards. Most food supply chains are not vertically integrated, but rather are
characterized by aggregation and mixing of products, making an individual product
difficult to trace from production to point-of-sale, particularly when supply chains
span international borders. Given that most farms located in developing countries are
only reachable by roads of dubious quality, arranging unannounced monitoring visits
is costly and difficult. Many monitoring standards require only an annual visit, which is
often known of in advance. As critics point out, this arrangement is insufficient to guard
against violations throughout the rest of the year.
There is also debate about whether retailers capture too large a portion of the pre-
mium charged to consumers. Some point out that when retailers mark up ethically
labeled food products, they may keep a large percentage of that margin for themselves,
and the consumers are none the wiser (Downie 2007, Griffiths 2012). In one case, a
retailer was criticized when it was found that 90 percent of the premium charged for a
cup of Fair Trade coffee went to the retailer, whereas only 10 percent was passed along
to farmers (Harford 2006). Rodrik voices skepticism about whether Fair-Trade farmers
whose coffee is sold through Starbucks are seeing any improvement in their livelihoods
or whether Starbucks is keeping the entire premium, using sympathetic consum-
ers to make a profit (Rodrik 2007). Alsever criticized TransFair USA for using most of
their revenue—$1.7 million of the $1.89 million they generated in licensing fees annu-
ally—on salaries, travel, conferences, and publications (Alsever 2006). The counter to
such critiques, however, is that some portion of the premium must go to the retailer
and the watchdog to cover costs associated with investing in a certified supply chain.
Nevertheless, critics claim that certification organizations take too large a cut.
In the case of all standards, there tends to be a tension between the imperatives of
the market and the social goals at the label's foundations (Luetchford 2011, Kennedy
2004). For example, for Fair Trade coffee traders to maintain high sales, the coffee must
be of good quality. However, the poorest farmers tend not to produce the highest qual-
ity coffee. Indeed, the production of high quality food requires investments in better
techniques, equipment, and inputs on the production end that is beyond the reach of
many of the poor farmers who the label seeks to assist. The Fair Trade movement's core
value of poverty eradication thus must be reconciled with the conflicting demands of