Agriculture Reference
In-Depth Information
Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) adopted the “substantial equivalence” principle.
Officially articulated by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), this principle posits regulating the safety of GM food in the same way as con-
ventional food if the former has the same chemical and nutritional compositions and
usage as the latter.6 In confirming the safety of seven products made by four foreign
companies later in 1996, the ministry explicitly refused the idea of requiring labeling
(Yasuda 1997). Meanwhile, both public and private R&D efforts intensified. By 1996
the majority of prefectural governments—longtime key players in developing seeds of
major crops—had launched agricultural biotechnology research, and various GM crops
(e.g., tomatoes, rice) were being developed throughout Japan (Nishimura 1997).
The first shipment of American GM crops entered Japan in September 1996, setting
of widespread debates and an organized opposition mobilization of consumer groups
on the basis of food safety concerns. These groups called for labeling as a way to avoid
consumption risks. The progressive consumer group Consumer Union of Japan and the
DNA Study Group launched the No! GMO Campaign, which quickly became an oppo-
sition leader in Japan. In December the Tokyo Assembly demanded that the govern-
ment confirm the safety of GM food and promptly make labeling mandatory—a move
subsequently followed by a number of local assemblies throughout Japan (Yasuda 1997).
Initially, the government took a firm stance against treating approved GMOs dif-
ferently from conventional crops, but the rapidly growing opposition prompted it to
reconsider labeling. As late as January 1997, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto pro-
nounced labeling of “safe” approved GM food as gratuitous, even denying the necessity
for the government to know how much entered Japan. However, by April the govern-
ment received requests for mandatory labeling from about 140 local assemblies and 100
groups—including consumer cooperatives, consumer groups, environmentalists, and
farmers.7 Quickly, the MAFF and the House of Representatives each created a special
panel for GM food labeling.
At the time, much debate about the safety of GM food occurred at the Diet (Japan's
legislative body) and local assemblies. Some expressed their concerns for its effect on
children via school lunch programs that the majority of grade schools have, while oth-
ers invoked BSE in the United Kingdom and E. coli O157, which shocked Japan by killing
school children and poisoning thousands in 1996. In 1997, nonetheless, GM food was
still unproblematic for many Japanese. While some cautious food manufacturers began
to avoid potentially contentious GMOs, most others remained passive and oblivious.
R&D efforts continued in both public and private sectors.
It was during 1998 that GM food skeptics and opponents achieved consumer mobi-
lization at an unprecedented scope, as official advisory panels deliberated on methods
and criteria of labeling. The government pushed for voluntary labels, emphasizing the
safety of approved GM food, Japan's high dependency on food imports, and the practical
difficulty of requiring exporting countries to provide labeling. Conversely, consumers
called for mandatory labels, specifically on the basis of food safety concerns: labeling
would allow them to avoid GM food, whose consumption risks are uncertain. With
the demand for mandatory labeling as a common denominator, a wide range of groups
Search WWH ::




Custom Search