Diets, Nutrition, and Poverty - The Oxford Topic of Food, Politics, and Society - page 356

(e.g., mental disorders), eye conditions, skin diseases, diseases of the digestive system
and genitourinary conditions (prostate disorders), among others (Mahal et al. 2009).
38. Age-standardized undiscounted DALYs have been widely used to measure the burden of
disease. These measure the number of years a person would lose due to disability and pre-
mature mortality. An advantage of using DALYs is that it considers years with disability
and thus includes conditions that, although not fatal, can be a large social and economic
burden (World Bank, 2011).
39. For details, see Popkin et al. (2012).
40. For details, see Gaiha, Jha, and Kulkarni (2010c).
41. BMI= (weight in kg/height in metres2). Those with BMI in the range 25-30 kg/m2 are clas-
sified as overweight, whereas those exceeding 30 are classified as obese. An expert con-
sultation organized by WHO in 2002 concluded that current WHO cut-off points do not
provide an adequate basis for taking action on risks related to overweight and obesity in
many Asian populations.
42. The relatively small effect of overweight/obesity should not be accepted at face value as it is
vitiated by selective reporting of BMI by adults.
43. On the latter, see Ruhm (2012) and Lee et al. (2012).
44. Real income transfer is measured as the difference between market and TPDS prices mul-
tiplied by the amount bought. For details, see Jha et al. (2013).
45. For definitions of acute and moderately poor, and moderately non-poor and relatively
affluent, see Table 13.A.1 at the end of this chapter.
46. Renamed recently as Mahatama Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
(MNREGS).
47. For a recent assessment, see Shankar and Gaiha (2013).
48. These are obtained by estimating an equation in which the dependent variable is
nutrient intake (including micronutrients) and the explanatory variables comprise
TPDS participation and NREG wage, nonwage income (all three appropriately instru-
mented) and other household characteristics. To compare the effect of a change in
TPDS participation with that of a change in NREG wage on nutrient intake, we use
one standard deviation increase in these variables. For details, see Jha, Bhattacharya,
and Gaiha (2011).
49. The presumption that Unique Identification or Aadhar will help target these transfers bet-
ter is not just naïve but mistaken (Khera, 2013).
50. This draws upon Gaiha (2003) and our more recent research on related issues. See also,
Kotwal and Ramaswami, this volume.
51. For an elaboration, see Gaiha (2003).
52. National Food Security Act implies ratification of NFSB by parliament. As the debate con-
tinues unabated and the Bill's passage without major modifications is not unlikely, we pre-
fer NFSB to NFSA. For amendments proposed to NFSB, see Lok Sabha Secretariat (2013),
and for a comment on these amendments, see Dreze (2013).
53. This summary relies largely on Himanshu and Sen (2011) but the critique draws on our
own research.
54. There are three different versions of the NFSB: one by the National Advisory Council (NAC);
another by the Department of Food and Public Distribution; and the third by the Prime Minister's
Advisory Council headed by C. Rangarajan (RC). For details, see Kumar and Ghosh (2012).
55. See Kochar (2005) who argues in favor of a universal food subsidy on the ground that
under TPDS targeting of BPL has suffered as amounts bought are a lower fraction of their