Food Security, Productivity, and Gender Inequality - The Oxford Topic of Food, Politics, and Society - page 273

This regional concentration makes food deficit regions overdependent on cer-
tain countries. It also leaves food-importing countries vulnerable to policies in the
exporting countries. For instance, if the latter shift large areas from food grains to
biofuels, or manage their agriculture inefficiently, or cut exports to deal with their
own needs, or do little to control speculative hoarding, the impact would be felt
by the importing countries. Adverse weather conditions can compound these other
effects. In fact, these are exactly the kinds of factors that underlay the 2007−2008
price rise, when the food price index rose by nearly 40% relative to 9% in 2006
(von Braun 2008). The adverse effects of this price rise fell on food-grain import-
ing countries and on net buyers of foodgrains within countries (Quisumbing, et al.
2008, see also von Braun 2008−2009). The worst affected were the poor, especially
women and children. By World Bank estimates, the price rise added 105 million
to the poor, mostly in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (Ivanic and Will 2008).
Although the 2007−2008 price spike was especially dramatic, the overall upward
trend in prices continues and is cause for major concern globally, as is the prospect
of price volatility.
To these short-term factors, we need to add long-term ones such as (i) dietary shifts
toward meat and milk with rising incomes in developing countries, leading to a higher
demand for grain to feed livestock and the land to grow it2; (ii) rising world population,
which is predicted to be 9 billion by 2050; and (iii) neglect of agriculture in developing
countries over a long period, reflected especially (as mentioned) in falling public invest-
ment in agricultural infrastructure and services.
In addition, we have the predicted averse effects of climate change on foodgrain
production. The impact is expected to be especially negative in South Asia and
sub-Saharan Africa. Assessments by the International Food Policy Research Institute
(IFPRI) in Washington DC, for instance, show that in 2050, climate change relative to
the no-climate-change scenario, could lower production of rice, wheat, and maize by
around 14%, 49%, and 9%, respectively, in South Asia, and by 15%, 36%, and 7%, respec-
tively, in sub-Saharan Africa (IFPRI 2009).3 Indeed, climate change, coupled with a
growing demand for food as populations and incomes grow, is also expected to trigger
price rise in the major staples, namely rice, wheat, and maize. These price increases need
not translate into increased production, given supply-side constraints faced by small
producers, who constitute a vast proportion of farmers in developing countries. Also,
higher feed prices will raise meat prices.
Extraordinary efforts will thus be needed to meet the food security demands of the
estimated 9 billion people by 2050, even without climate change. With climate change,
this is even more of an imperative. If food output lags behind population, the availabil-
ity of per capita calories in the developing world in 2050 will be lower than in 2000. By
some estimates, this could result in a 20% higher child malnutrition than would be the
case with no climate change (IFPRI 2009). Indeed, even with the best efforts at mitigat-
ing climate change, the poor, and especially women and children, are likely to suffer dis-
proportionately. The gender factor is, in fact, a critical one as we look toward the future,
given women's multiple roles in ensuring food security.