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notion of “purpose” is used in the first place; i.e. how does it influence dis-
course, explanations, argumentations, etc.?)
One nice feature of this notion is that it relieves one of the need to account
for the way things are done which are intended. Every time I tie my
shoelaces, or you slip into your pumps, we do it differently. We do it in
thousands of unpredictable variations, but the outcome is predictable; my
shoelaces are tied, your shoes are on your feet.
On the other hand, it is quite impossible for a physicist to invent the
“Laws of Nature” with which to compute our behavior from the initial con-
ditions of my united shoelaces or your pumps in your wardrobe; that is to
compute the paths, the “trajectories” and the movements that our bodies
and our limbs are taking, which tie my laces or put shoes on your feet. The
physicist's “causa efficientis” is impotent. But the cyberneticist's “causa
finalis” does it all. If the intentions are clear, (independent of the initial con-
ditions) the sensorimotor loops will adjust and readjust our movements
until my laces are tied; your shoes are on your feet.
Y. Thank you. I feel much better with my shoes on. I see now the purpose
of using the notion of purpose. One does not need to know how to get there;
one needs only to know the there . This is a very nice feature indeed! Is there
a bad feature too?
H. Yes there is. The ugly feature of the notions of “purpose,” “goal,” and
“end,” is that they can be used to justify the specific ways of getting there;
“The end justified the means.” And as we know now, the means can be very
ugly indeed. The question should be, “Do the means justify the end?”
Y. If we would remember to ask the question this way, the world could be
a very different place. But now Heinz, to use your language, tell me how
did second-order cybernetics “come upon” you?
H. Through a woman, of course. It was Margaret Mead. You remember the
quote I cited in my address? It came from a speech she gave, I think in 1968.
Since she rarely uses titles for her talks and almost never reads from a script,
I sent her the transcript from a recording asking for her corrections and a
title. There was no reply. I urged by telegram; still no answer. Finally, I tried
to reach her by telephone at the Museum of Natural History in New York
where she was a curator. I was told she was with the Papuas, or the Tro-
brianders, or the Samoans, and could not be reached. So, I had to edit her
speech and invent a title. What struck me was her speaking about cyber-
netics in a cybernetical way. Thus I chose for her the title, “Cybernetics of
Cybernetics.”
It appears to me today that the interest in the peculiar properties of con-
cepts that apply to themselves, (or even need themselves to come into
being) must then have been floating in the air. Francisco Varela, the Chilean
neurophilosopher referred to them as “self-referential,” the Swedish logico-
mathematician Lars Lofgren as “auto-logical.”
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