Ethics and Second-Order Cybernetics - Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition - page 289

I present this principle here, in its most brutal form, to demonstrate its
non-sensicality. If the properties of the observer (namely to observe and
describe) are eliminated, there is nothing left; no observation, no descrip-
tion. However, there was a justification for adhering to this principle, and
this justification was fear; fear that paradoxes would arise when the
observers were allowed to enter the universe of their observations. And you
know the threat of paradoxes. To steal their way into a theory is like having
the cloven-hoofed foot of the devil stuck in the door of orthodoxy.
Clearly when cyberneticians were thinking of partnership in the circu-
larity of observing and communicating, they were entering into a forbidden
land. In the general case of circular closure, A implies B; B implies C; and
(Oh, horror!) C implies A! Or in the reflexive case, A implies B, and (Oh,
shock!) B implies A! And now the devil's cloven-hoof in its purest form,
the form of self-reference; A implies A (Outrage!)
I would like to invite you now to join me in a land where it is not for-
bidden; rather, where one is encouraged to speak about oneself. What else
can one do anyway? This turn from looking at things “out there” to looking
at “looking itself,” arose I think, from significant advances in neurophysi-
ology and neuropsychiatry. It appeared that one could now dare to ask the
question of how the brain works. One could dare to write a theory of the
brain.
It may be argued that over the centuries since Aristotle, physicians and
philosophers again and again developed theories of the brain. So, what's
new of today's cyberneticians? What is new is the profound insight that a
brain is required to write a theory of a brain. From this follows that a theory
of the brain, that has any aspirations for completeness, has to account for
the writing of this theory. And even more fascinating, the writer of this
theory has to account for her or himself. Translated into the domain of
cybernetics; the cybernetician, by entering his own domain, has to account
for his or her own activity. Cybernetics then becomes cybernetics of cyber-
netics, or second-order cybernetics .
Ladies and Gentlemen, this perception represents a fundamental change,
not only in the way we conduct science, but also how we perceive teaching,
learning, the therapeutic process, organizational management, and so on
and so forth; and I would say, of how we perceive relationships in our daily
life. One may see this fundamental epistemological change if one first con-
siders oneself to be an independent observer who watches the world go by;
as opposed to a person who considers oneself to be a participant actor in
the drama of mutual interaction of the give and take in the circularity of
human relations.
In the case of the first example, as a result of my independence, I can tell
others how to think and act, “Thou shalt...”“Thou shalt not...”This is
the origin of moral codes. In the case of the second example, because of my
interdependence, I can only tell myself how to think and act, “I shall...”
“I shall not...”This is the origin of ethics.