Cybernetics of Epistemology - Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition - page 233

quadruples of a Touring Machine computing the code number of another
machine or its own cannot be confused with the structure of the computed
tape descriptions. 7 Or neurophysiologically expressed: in order say “lectern”
or to know that a lectern is located here, I do not have to have the letters l-
e-c-t-e-r-n inscribed into my brain, nor does a tiny representation of a lectern
have to be located somewhere internally of me. Rather, I need a structure
which computes for me the different manifestations of a description. But all
of this belongs in the session on “Artificial Intelligence” and here we are in
a session on “Biocybernetics of the Central Nervous System.” I thus consider
it more fitting to talk about the effects of my earlier propositions as regards
activities in the central nervous system.
Let us first note the immensity of the problem with which we are con-
fronted. For this purpose let us recall the law of undifferentiated encoding.
The principle of undifferentiated encoding:
The states of a nerve cell do not encode the nature of the cause of its activity. (Encoded
is only “this much at this part of my body.” but not “what.”)
One example: one cell in the retina in a certain moment absorbs a stream
of photons of x amount per second. In the process it creates an electro-
chemical potential which is a function of the magnitude of the stream of
photons, which means that the “how much” is being encoded: but the signals
which are the cause of this potential neither provide any indication that
photons were the cause of activity, nor do they tell us of which frequencies
the stream of photons consisted. Exactly the same is true for all other cells
of sensory perception. Take, for instance, the hair cells in the cochlea of
Meisner's touch bodies, or the papillae of taste, or whatever cells you may
choose. In none of them is the quality of the cause of activity encoded, only
the quantity. An indeed, “out there” there is no light and there are no
colors—there are electromagnetic waves; “out there” there are no sounds
and no music—there are longitudinal periodic pressure waves; “out there”
there is no heat or cold—there is a higher or lower median molecular
kinetic energy, and so, and so forth, and quite certainly there is no pain “out
there.”
Then the fundamental question is: how do we experience the world in its
overwhelming multiplicity when as incoming data we only have: first, the
intensity of stimuli, and second, the bodily coordinates of the source of
stimuli, i.e. stimulation at a certain point of my body?
Given that the qualities of sensory impression are not encoded in the
receptive apparatus, it is clear that the central nervous system is organized
in such a way that it computes these qualities from this meager input.
We (at least I) know very little about these operations. I am, therefore,
already looking forward to several lectures that will deal with this problem,
especially those of Donald McKay, Horst Mittelstaedt, and Hans Lukas
Teuber, who will discuss their famous reafference-principle. I myself will
have to limit myself to a few hints regarding the nature of these operations.