Cybernetics of Epistemology - Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition - page 231

That means that information—not in the sense of information theory, but
in its everyday meaning—has its origin in this creative circle. Only that has
meaning which I can “grasp.”
My second preliminary proposition deals with the problem of a complete
and closed theory of the brain. If any one of us mortals ever deals with this
problem he will, without any doubt, use his brain. This observation is at the
basis of my second preliminary proposition.
My second preliminary proposition:
The laws of physics, the so-called “laws of nature,” can be described by us. The laws
of brain functions—or ever more generally—the laws of biology, must be written in
such a way that the writing of these laws can be deducted from them, i.e., they have
to write themselves.
Let me now return to my theme, namely, that an epistemology is, for all
practical purposes, a cybernetics. This will become clear at once if “episte-
mology” is understood as a “theory of knowledge acquisition,” rather than
a theory of knowledge.
While in German the creative process of becoming knowledgeable is
indicated by the “ generativ ” or “ creativ ” prefix “ er... ”, to augment static
knowledge (Kenntnis) by new knowledge Kenntnis becomes Er-Kenntnis.
The English version of this process is borrowing from Greek, the root “ g
n ” which indicates emergence (genesis) as well as perception (cognition) to
be a creative processes.
I would like now to replace the phrase “knowledge acquisition” with the
term “cognition,” and suggest for this process an operational definition
which preserves its semantic essence and, moreover, enables us to make use
of contemporary conceptual tools:
“Computing” in this context is not at all restricted to the numerical
domain, but is taken in its general sense as “contemplating ( putare ) things
together ( com . . . )”. Some skeptics most likely will begin raising their eye-
brows. “Why 'a' reality—why not 'the' reality?” one may ask. After all, we
are here—the Cybernetics Symposium, the Meistersingerhalle in
Nuremberg, the physical universe—how could there be any other reality?
Indeed, a deep epistemological abyss separates the two views, which are
distinguished by using, in one case, the definite article “the”, and in the
other, the indefinite article “a”. The distinction here arises from two fun-
damentally different positions regarding “reality.” When we hold that dif-
ferent independent observations are confirmations , we talk about the
reality. However, we can take the position that only through correlating dif-
ferent independent observations, realities are emerging.
The first case: my visual sense tells me, here stands a lectern; my sense of
touch confirms that. Also, our chairman, Dr. Kupfmuller, would say so, if I
were to ask him.
The second case: my visual sense tells me there stands something; my
sense of touch tells me there stands something, and I hear Dr. Kupfmuller