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as we see it is “real,” or just a phantasmagory, a dream, an illusion of our
fancy. A decision in this dilemma is in so far pertinent to my discussion,
since—if the latter alternative should hold true—my original thesis assert-
ing the nonsensicality of the conception of an isolated self-organizing
system would pitiably collapse.
I shall now proceed to show the reality of the world as we see it, by reduc-
tio ad absurdum of the thesis: this world is only in our imagination and the
only reality is the imagining “I”.
Thanks to the artistic assistance of Mr. Pask who so beautifully illustrated
this and some of my later assertions,* it will be easy for me to develop my
argument.
Assume for the moment that I am the successful business man with the
bowler hat in Fig. 2, and I insist that I am the sole reality, while everything
else appears only in my imagination. I cannot deny that in my imagination
there will appear people, scientists, other successful businessmen, etc., as for
instance in this conference. Since I find these apparitions in many respects
similar to myself, I have to grant them the privilege that they themselves
may insist that they are the sole reality and everything else is only a con-
coction of their imagination. On the other hand, they cannot deny that their
fantasies will be populated by people—and one of them may be I, with
bowler hat and everything!
With this we have closed the circle of our contradiction: If I assume that
I am the sole reality, it turns out that I am the imagination of somebody
else, who in turn assumes that he is the sole reality. Of course, this paradox
is easily resolved, by postulating the reality of the world in which we happily
thrive.
Having re-established reality, it may be interesting to note that reality
appears as a consistent reference frame for at least two observers. This
becomes particularly transparent, if it is realized that my “proof” was
exactly modeled after the “Principle of Relativity,” which roughly states
that, if a hypothesis which is applicable to a set of objects holds for one
object and it holds for another object, then it holds for both objects simul-
taneously, the hypothesis is acceptable for all objects of the set. Written in
terms of symbolic logic, we have:
()() () Æ+
[
(
)
] Æ () ()
Ex Ha
&
Hx
Ha x
xHx
(1)
Copernicus could have used this argument to his advantage, by pointing
out that if we insist on a geocentric system, [ H ( a )], the Venusians, e.g. could
insist on a venucentric system [( Hx )]. But since we cannot be both, center
and epicycloid at the same time [ H ( a + x )], something must be wrong with
a planetocentric system.
* Figures 2, 5 and 6.
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